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CHAPTER L
LAW AND LAWS.
Law is the science of right living. Laws are the applications
thereof to the conduct of man in organized society. Law never
varies: laws must continually change. Adjustment of prin
ciple to social conditions is a never ending process. The
closer this adjustment the more beneficent and efficient is the
legal system. Laws should express the needs of the enlightened
conscience of the commmiity. "To follow not to force public
inclination, to give direction and form to the general sense of
the community is the true end of legislation."
As law is the embodiment of principles of which laws are
the applications, in elucidating principles we discuss the rules
adopted by man for the applications. Man in society forms
government. Government promulgates rules. These rules
constitute the legal fabric.
ESSENTIALS OP A LAW.
1. Law must emanate from the supreme power in the State.
"Were the author equalled in authority by any other power,
were it less in authority than any other power, in the former
case, obedience would be a matter of choice, in the latter,
disobedience, a duty. Legislation is the supreme act of the
sovereign. In America sovereignty resides in the people. The
lawmaker and the subject are one and the same. In theory
government derives all its just powers from the consent of the
governed. Although the laws are the result of the consent of
the governed, it must be understood that this consent is given
when the law making power is conferred on government and
does not affect the imperative nature of laws duly enacted by
government. Laws thus enacted bind all alike.
2. It follows inevitably from the proposition just stated that
laws are imperative. The command of the laws is irresistible.
The whole physical force of the State is behind it. It is true
that in many instances neither laws nor physical force can
compel obedience. Pains and penalties are imposed upon the
disobedient.
3. Laws are permanent, not subject to change to suit vary
ing circumstances. They continue in force xmtil repealed or
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State. It is the supreme law of the land. Any Act of Congress,
any clause of a State Constitution, any act of a State Legisla
ture, or of any law-making body whatever, which contravenes
this Constitution is null.
2. Acts op Congress and Tre.vties made by the treaty-making
power, in accord with the Constitution, rank next in authority.
Acts of Congress are valid only when dealing with the sub
jects permitted in the Constitution. At first sight, it might
seem strange that a treaty, a compact between this country and
a foreign nation, should be regarded as a law, when we recall
that at least one of the parties participating in the making, is
not in any sense the people nor any of the people of the United
States. It matters not who frames the treaty, the adoption by
the proper authority of the country is the act which gives it
the force of law here.
3. Constitutions of the States. Third in order of authority
are the Constitutions of the States. These are written instru
ments framed by delegates chosen by the people of the States
and ratified by the people themselves. They emanate from the
people direct. They give, affirmatively or negatively, the sub
jects upon which the State Legislatures may or may not enact
laws.
4. Acts op Legislatures. The Acts of the Legislatures of the
States are fourth in order of supremacy. The people of the
States can, of course, authorize their law-making body to
legislate upon any subject whatever, except those subjects
which they have expressly agreed to commit to the Federal
Government and those subjects upon which they expressly
agreed (by adopting the Constitution of the United States)
that they will not legislate. In adopting a Constitution the
people expressly name the subjects of legislation, and either
affirmatively or negatively confine the law-making body within
these limits. Acts of the Legislature therefore must be upon
those subjects only which are permitted by the State Consti
tution, and, of course, not upon those subjects expressly de
clared to be within the domain of the Federal Government,
nor upon those subjects forbidden in the Constitution of the
United States.
5. Municip.\l Ordinances. Ordinances of Municipal Corpora-
^ ^ ^ S- - .-5^ • yr
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tions properly adopted in accordance with the charters and not
in conflictwith any of the laws of the classes above enumerated
have the force and effect of laws.
WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN LAWS.
Laws are frequently spoken of as written or unwritten. By
the former is meant all rules of conduct prescribed by the
duly authorized law-making power. The terms written law
and statute are practically synonymous. By the latter is meant
customs which have the binding force and effect of laws.
All the laws of the United States are written; i. e., are
either in the Constitution or have been enacted by the Federal
law-making power. There is no Federal Common Law. The
laws of the several States' are mostly written; i. e., enacted or
adopted by the proper law-making bodies. Unwritten or cus
tomary laws prevail in some of the States wherein certain
principles of the Common Law of England applicable therein
which have not been expressly adopted by legislative enaet-
ttient are of force.
Writt'En. The written laws ai-e found in the Constitutions
and in the Acts of Congress and of the State Legislatures. In
some States, of which Georgia is one, all the laws are statu-
and all the public laws are codified; i. e., arranged sys
tematically and published by authority of the State.
Unwritten. Customary laws are found in treatises of pri
vate persons learned in the law, or in the decisions of courts
of last resort, where they are stated as being recognized laws
of the State from the foundation of its government.
Trade Customs. Trade usages are not laws, but when gen
eral and known are binding on parties as terms of contracts.
To illustrate: if one buy of a silversmith a solid silver dish,
finds that it is composed of half metal silver and half alloy;
should it be a custom of the silversmiths' trade to call this
compound solid silver, the contract is good and the price of
the article is collectable at law.
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS.
The rules for the interpretation of laws and for the con
struction of statutes are the result of human reason applied to
human experience. They are the direct application of prin-
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ciple to practice. Statutes sometimes repeat them with modi
fications and additions. The foundation rules are stated by
Blackstone with his usual unapproachable clearness, and the
substance of his .statement is here given.
The object of all interpretation is to ascertain the intention
of the maker of the law. The means resorted to for this pur
pose are embodied in the rules.
1. "Words. The words of the law shall be given their usual
and known signification, the popular use being preferred.
Technical terms and terms of art are to be taken according
to their acceptation in the science or art. Thus a law regu
lating the keeping of tigers, and another law making blind
tigers nuisances, clearly use the word tigers in two very ^differ
ent senses.
2. Context, If the meaning of the words is doubtful, it is
useful to compare them with the context in which they are
employed. The preamble should throw light upon the whole
law. Other laws dealing with the same matter may be looked
to, for the proper meaning of the law under investigation.
Thus a .statute abolishing entails, must be explained by the
laws defining entails.
3. Subject Matter. "Words are always to be understood as
having regard to the subject matter of the law. Thus a law
dealing with ecclestical matters may use the word provisions in
a peculiar sense, different from the ordinary meaning.
4. Effect jUnd Consequences. Where words literally under
stood bear an obsurd meaning, the received sense must not be
taken . The Bolognian law inflicting severe penalties on one
who drew blood in the street, was held not to apply to a sur
geon who bled a man, fallen in a fit, with the object of re
lieving him.
5. Reason xVnd Spirit. This rule forbids a technical and too
strict interpretation of a law. It is a valuable but dangerous
rule. Where the law works a hardship in a particular case,
it should not be anulled by reasoning. A reasonable interpre
tation is neither too strict nor yet too lax. The sailor who
remained on the vessel when deserted by the crew, because he
was too ill to leave, was not within the reason of the law which
rewarded one who stayed by the ship when in danger of being
... -
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wrecked. A strict interpretation of a law is however less
daagerous than too liberal a construction. The latter tends
to unsettle the law itself and thus destroy it.
The rules for construing statutes are:
1. In construing a statute, three things are to be considered,
the old law, the mischief and the remedy. That is, how the
the law stood at the making of the statute, what was the mis
chief for which it did not provide, and what remedy does the
statute provide therefor?
2. Penal statutes are construed strictly. Acts not covered
by the words of the statute are not within the penalty.
3. Statutes against fraud are construed liberally. The dis
tinction^ between this and the preceding rule is, that a penal
statute, inflicts punishment on a person, statutes against fraud
apply to acts and serve to point out when they are voidable.
1 statute must be construed with another, soa e ect be given to the whole. A saving totally repug
nant to the body of the law is void.
5. Where statutes conflict, the last one prevails as it re-
conflicting laws. This may by direct negation0 the former statute, or by necessary implication in case the
two are repugnant to each other.
6 If astatute repeal another and is itself repealed, the first
statute IS revived without formal words to that effect.
n general then it may be said that laws cover the social
organism as the atmosphere surrounds the earth. There is no
bare spot, no^ vacuum. When a new law is made, it takes
e p ace of existent law. When a law is repealed, pre-exist-
ent law takes it place.
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CHAPTER II.
RIGHTS.
Laws are rules defining and protecting rights. The definition
of rights constitutes the substantive law; the protection of rights
is the province of remedial law.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW.
Rights. Rights are those things which persons in human
society possess and enjoy under the laws, and some things which
they demand of others. Rights are conferred by law upon per
sons. A person is either a human being or a corporation. The
one is created by God, the other is the creature of human society
acting through government. The privation of a right is a wrong.
Wrongs may be perpetrated, either by a direct infraction of a
legal right, or by a dereliction of duty causing damage to the
one to whom the duty is owed. Generally speaking every wrong
involves a dereliction of duty, but the division just given is
usually recognized for convenience. Rights are grouped as in
dividual and relative. Individual or primary rights are con
ferred by the laws upon a member of society independently of his
connection with other members. Relative rights are given by
the laws to membei's of the society by reason of their connection
with the government or with other members.
Primary Rights. The be.st known classification of the pri
mary rights of an individual is given by Blackstone, as: se
curity, liberty and property. The first of these Jie subdivides
into security of life, limb, body, health and reputation. Liberty,
the freedom from interference with locomotion, might well be
treated in modern times as a subdivision of the right of security,
but it also includes today religious liberty, freedom to labor,
freedom of speech, right to form the marriage tie and to con
tract in matters not involving property. Property, in its high
est sense, is that absolute, despotic dominion a person may have
in things external, exclusive of the rights of others. Its ele
ments are, possession, the right of possession, power of control
and disposition, the thing owned passing by succession at the
death of the owner and being reachable for debt.
Relative Rights. Relative rights are classed as public, civil
and private. The first deal with the relation of the individual
PRINCIPIA OF LAW 13
to society, and include the structure and powers of government.
The second define the powers and privileges of citizens, includ
ing the elective franchise, equal participation in the benefits
conferred by government, (notably education), and enjoyment
of public utilities without discrimination. The last are called
the domestic relations and cover the rights and duties conferred
and imposed by the laws upon persons related to each other as
master and servant, husband and wife, parent and child, guar
dian and ward.
Wrongs. Wrong is a privation of a legal I'ight. Private
wrongs take the shape either of a breach of a contract or the
privation of the legal non-contractual right of another. The
former is treated under the subject of contracts, the latter of
torts.
Duties. Rights and duties are reciprocal terms, the definition
of the former necessarily indicates the latter. For this reason
the subject does not require or receive a separate treatment.
Nevertheless there are instances where a statute imposes duties
upon persons or classes of persons. A nice quetion arises whether
imposition of duty on one confers rights on another, what is the
nature of the right and upon whom is it conferred. This may
usually be answered by reference to the statute itself.
Where the law confers right on one, that of itself imposes
duties on others to observe that right.
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CHAPTER III.
PUBLIC RELATIONS.
SOVEREIGNTY GOVERNMENT,
The logical order in which rights should be treated is the fol
lowing: (1) Public Relations; (2) Primary Rights, Security and
Liberty; (3) Civil Rights; (4) Private Relations; (5) Primary
Right of Property.
The third primary right, viz.: that of property is taken last,
because of the greater length of the discussion, and because the
subject may be better comprehended after some acquaintance
with rights which it would naturally precede.
PUBLIC RELATIONS.
The connection of the individual with the public gives rise to
rights and duties, which are ascertained by a study of the struc
ture and functions of government. Government is the machin
ery created hy the sovereign for the purpose of declaring and
protecting rights. As government is a creature of the sovereign,
our first inquiry must be into the attributes of sovereignty. As
has been said, sovereignty resides in the people. The agencies
designated by the people to exercise such portions of sovreignty
as the people permit constitute the branches of government.
The attributes of sovereignty are:
1. Supremacy. That the sovereign is supreme within the
jurisdiction is axiomatic. Sovereignty and supremacy are some
times used as interchangeable terms. Evidently it is essential
to the vei*y existence of an independent State that no power,
foreign or domestic, shall equal her own in her territory. In
this sense the people are supreme, and there is no power equal
to that of the people in the territory composing the United
States. The people through government, their creature, make
and enforce laws. These laws are therefore of supreme force.
This is a government of law not of men. An illustration of this
principle is found in the rule that one cannot sue a State.
2. Perfection. The ancient writers ascribe to the sovereign
the attribute of perfection, the maxim being: "The King can do
no wrong." Hiis might mean that whatsoever the people in
the exercise of sovereign power should ordain and declare to be
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law would ipso facto become lawful, although it might have been
previously unlawful, or judged by some standards, immoral.
The sense of the maxim is clear if we use the words right and
lawful as synomyraous. As this is not so it is better to say the
sovereign can do no unlawful act. Illustrating this principle are
the rules that the Statute of limitations of actions at law do not
apply to the State. The State is never under disabiliy nor is it
ever chargeable Avith laches. The motive of the legislature can
not be impugned.
3. Ubiquity. The legal ubiquity of the sovereign means that
any act of an officer in the discharge of duty is the act of the
sovereign. Thus whenever a court is in session, the sovereign is
there present in the person of the officers.
4. Perpetuity. Any end of sovereignty or any break in its
continuity must mean destruction. Sovereignty must reside
somewhere. "When sovereignty over the American Colonies was
relinquished by the British crown, eo instanti it vested in the
people of the several States mentioned in the treaty. Upon the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States a part of the
sovereignty Avas relinquished by the people and at once vested
in the Federal State. The residue not delegated in the State
Constitutions to the State Governments, of course, is reserved
to the people.
5. Foreign Relations. Transactions betAveen independent
States and Nations are relations betAveen the respective sov
ereigns. To represent and in fact to be the State in all foreign
relations is a prerogative necessarily inherent in the sovereign.
The u.sual exercise of this prerogrative is in making treaties,
declaring Avar and concluding peace.
6. Domestic Apfmr.?. The sovereign poAver of a State estab
lishes government, Avith the necessary machinery for the dis
charge of functions, legislative, executive and judicial; Avith
authority to support by leyyirig and collecting taxes; to sustain
by maintaining an army and navy; Avith the duty of maintain
ing highAvays; Avith the poAver to condemn private properties
for public purposes.
HISTORICiAL.
During the colonial period the sovereignty of what were
afterward knoAvn as the Original Thirteen States resided in the
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British crown. Upon the signing of the treaty of peace after the
war of the Revolution, each of the colonies became a sovereign
State. Each had a form of government or immediately adopted
a form of government suited to her needs, and through these
State governments sovereignty ^vas exercised by the people in
whom it had vested the moment it was relinquished by Great
Britain. Neither then nor since was the whole power of sov
ereignty entrusted by the people to the governments. The peo
ple of each State have declared in writing the powers entrusted
to the State government and have prescribed the methods by
which these powers thus conferred are to be exercised. These
are the State Constitutions. They will be treated later. Suffice
it to say at this point that they are usually so framed that the
governments created by them have the right to exercise all the
sovereign powers resident in the people of the State, subject to
the limitations in the State Constitutions themselves.
For reasons not necessary to be discussed there was in the year
1787, a surrender by the people of the several States, or by the
States themselves, or by the whole people (it is useless to en
quire by which) of certain sijecified sovereign powers to a sep
arate person, viz.: The United States of America. These power's
are enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. This
act, clothing with sovereign powers, defining and providing
means and machinery for their exercise, in a word creating a
government, had the effect of creating a new State, viz.: the
Federal State. We find therefore that each State and the peo
ple of each State parted with a portion of their sovereign pow
ers, that in this country sovereign power is divided and is res
ident partly in the Federal State and partly in the several States.
Neither exercises complete sovereignty. Neither in the complete
sense is a State.
Thus we conclude, the Federal Government exercises those
branches of sovereignty to it delegated in the Constitution of the
United States, as the administrator of powei-s resident in the
people. The State Government exercises those sovereign powers
conferred upon it by the people of the State, as the creature of
the people of the State. In the people of the several States
re?ide all undelegated power.
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CHAPTER lY.
UNITED STATES.
Our first inquiiy is, what branches of the sovereign power
are in the Federal State and the manner in which they are
exercised ? For this purpose we look to the Constitution of the
United States. Of this instrument we make for convenience the
following analysis:
(I) Powers expressly and directly conferred; (II) Powers
renounced by the States; (III) Limitations upon the power of
the United States.
I. POWERS CONFERRED.
1. To organize a government, for the exercise of the delegated
powers.
2. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay
the debts, and provide for the common defence and general wel
fare of the United States.
3. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
4. To regulate foreign and inter-state commerce, and com
merce with the Indian Tribes.
5. To establish uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
bankruptcy laws.
6. To coin money, regnlate the value thereof, fix the standard
of weights and measures.
7. To provide for punishing counterfeiters of the currency
and securities.
8. To establish post-ofSces and post roads.
9. To issue patents and copyrights to inventors and authors.
10. To define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas,
and offenses against the law of nations.
11. To declare war, grant letters of marque, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water.
12. To raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a
navy.
13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the
army and navy.
14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
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15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining th.e
militia,
17. To legislate for the District of Columbia and all laud«s
ceded to the United States for public purposes.
II. POWERS RENOUNCED BY THE STATES.
The States agree that they will exercise none of the following
powers:
1. Enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation.
2. Grant letters of marque and reprisal. '
3. Coin money; emit bills of credit.
4. Make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender.
5. Pass any bill of attainder.
6. Pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation
of contracts.
7. Grant any title of nobility.
The States further agree that, without the consent of Con
gress, they will exercise none of the following power-«:
8. Lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for
executing inspection laws. Lay any duty of tonnage.
9. Keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace.
10. Enter into any compact or agreement with another State,
or with any foreign power.
11. Engage in war, unless invaded or in imminent danger
of invasion.
The States made further agreements which are in the nature
of renunciation of sovereign power, as follows:
13. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
14. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States, and of the State wherein they reside: (a) No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States; (b) Nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with
out due process of law; (c) Nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
15. The right of the citizens of the United States to vote sliall
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not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of sen-itude.
It will be noticed that of the powers renounced by the States
those enunaerated as 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, are expressly conferred
upon the United States.
III. LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Constitution of the United States contains an enumeration
of things which the Federal Government is forbidden to do, as
they concern chiefly the rights of individuals, they are sometimes
called the bill of rights, they are as follows:
1. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus
pended, except the public safety require it in case of rebellion or
invasion.
2. No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shaU be passed.
4. No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be levied, except in
proportion to the census.
5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
State. No preference shall be given to the ports of the State-s.
6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in conse
quence of appropriations made by law.
7. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assem e, and to petition the government for a redress of griev
ances.
8.^ The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
•ti, shall, in time of peace, be quai-tered in any house,wi ou e consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a
10 by law.
houses, pan™
1 ' ettects, against unreasonable searches andsei^^r^, shall not be violated.
wise answer for a capital or other-
grand iur unless on a presentment or indictment of a
fense to h ®ball any pei-soii be subject, for the same of-
comp'elled jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
nor be den'^ *^i^miual ease to be a witne.ss against himself.ived of life^ liberty, or property, without due pro-
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cess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
12. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed;
and be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.
14. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved.
15. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
16. The judicial power of the United States shall not be con
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or pros
ecuted against one of .the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens of any foreign State.
17. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or
forfeiture except during the life of the person attained.
18. The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude.
The Constitution imposes on the United States the following
duties: to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican
form of government, to protect them against invasion, and on
application of the legislature or of the executive, against do
mestic violence.
Provision is also made for the admission of new States, and
for amendments to the Constitution.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con
stitution, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people.
It will be seen from this analysis that some of the powers
renounced by the States are delegated to the United States.
Attention has been called to these. Some of the renounced pow
ers are denied to the United States, and as to some the Consti
tution is silent. Thus the States agree to pass no ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of a contract. The United
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States is forbidden to pass any ex post facto law, and the im
pairing of the obligation of a contract is not mentioned. It
may be generally stated that the limitations on the powers of the
United States are usually placed upon the State Governments
by their respective Constitutions.
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CHAPTER V.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
The government created to exercise the powers conferred on
the United States consists of three independent and co-ordinate
branches: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
CONGRESS.
The law-making power is vested in a body called the Congress
of the United States. It is composed of two chambers or houses,
viz.: the Senate and the House of Representatives.
SENATE.
The Senate is composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by popular vote, for a term of six years. One Senator
from each State is elected every third year. The Senate is there
fore a permanent body. Senators must be thirty years of age;
nine years citizens of the United States; and inhabitants of the
States from which they are chosen. The Vice-President of the
United States is ex-officio President of the Senate, he has no
vote except in case the Senate be equally divided on a question.
The Senate alone has power to confirm or reject nominations to
office made by the President. In case of impeachment of an
officer, the Senate sits as a court for the trial, being presided
over by the Chief Justice of the United States. The prosecution
is conducted by the members of the House chosen for that pur
pose.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The members of the House of Representatives are chosen for
a term of two years by the people of the several States, who are
qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of
the State Legislatures. The House of Representatives is a new
body every two years. At the organization of the new House, the
Congress is known as the 5th, 10th, or 40th Congress, as the case
may be. The number of Representatives is apportioned among
the States according to population. Representatives must be
twenty-five years of age; seven years citizens of the United
States; and inhabitants of the State where elected. All bills
for raising revenue musforiginate in the House. The House
begins impeachment proceedings before the Senate.
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Except in the ease of the presidency of the Senate, each house
elects its own officers. Each house formulates its own rules of
procedure and judges the qualifications of its members.
The Congress has powere to legislate upon any of the subjects
already enumerated in a previous chapter, and may enact any
laws necessary to the exercise of the powers delegated. The
latter is called an implied power. The exercise of implied
powers has been much extended since the early days of the
government, and especially has the power to promote the gen
eral welfare been greatly enlarged. When a bill has been
passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President
it becomes a law. If the President veto the bill, it may be
passed over his objection by a two-third majority of both
Houses.
THE PRESIDENT.
The executive power of the United 'States is vested in the
President. The machinery of the executive branch of the gov
ernment is under the management of appointees of the Presi
dent. These constitute the cabinet. They are twice mentioned
in the Constitution, as principal officers in the executive de
partments, and as heads of departments. Of these officers and
their duties, we will speak later.
Powers and Duties. The powers and duties of the President
are the following:
1. He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of
the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States; he may re
quire written opinions of cabinet officers; he shall have power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the Uniied
States, except in cases of impeachment.
2. He has power by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, (two-thirds concurring) to malce treaties; he shall nomi
nate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United
States, not in the Constitution otherwise appointed.
3. He has power to fill vacancies occurring during the recess of
the Senate, such appointee holding to the end of the next session.
4. He shall give Congress information of the state of the
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Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordi
nary occasions, convene both Houses or either of them; he may
adjourn them, when they disagree on time of adjournment;
he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; he shall
commission all officers of the United States.
Elections and Qualifications. The President is elected for
a term of four years. The election is held in November of the
year preceding the expiration of a presidential term. For ex
ample, the term of a president expires on 4th March, 1905, the
election for his successor is held on Tuesday, 8th November,
1904. On the same day in all the States, the voters, who are
qualified under the laws of the States, choose by ballot the
members of the electoral college. Each State is entitled to as
many members as the whole number of Congressmen from the
State. The electors shall meet at the State capitals, east their
ballots for President and Vice-President, make lists thereof, and
transmit the lists to the President of the Senate at Washington.
In the presence of both Houses of Congress, the President of the
Senate opens and counts ttie ballots. The person receiving a
majority of the votes cast for President, is declared elected
to that office. If no one receives a majority, the House of Rep
resentatives immediately elects a President, from the three
persons receiving the highest number of electoral votes.
Bach State has one vote in the election by the House. The
Vice-President is elected in the same manner.
The President must be a natural-born citizen of the United
States, must be thirty-five years of age, must have been a resi
dent within the United States for fourteen years.
VICE-PRESIDENT.
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President.
Failing this, the members of the Cabinet shall succeed in the
order mentioned below.
cabinet.
The principal officers of the executive depeartments, or the
heads of the departments constitute the President's cabinet.
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These offices are created by Congress, under the general power
to effectuate by legislation the powers expressly conferred in
the Constitution. The members of the cabinet are appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. To them is committed the general supeiwision of the
affairs of their several departments, the execution of the laws
governing the same. They form a council of advice to the
President and under his supervision manage the details of the
departments.
The Cabinet officers are: Secretary of State, Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of War, Attorney General, Postmaster Gen
eral, 'Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Labor.
The power of the President to veto a bill passed by Congress
is in the nature of a negative legislative function. When the
Vice-president casts a deciding vote in the Senate, he partici
pates in making laws.
JUDICIART.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in the
Supreme Court, and such other courts as Congress may establish.
The other courts established by Congress will be enumerated
and their powers and jurisdictions will be discussed in the ap
propriate place under remedial laws.
The Supreme Court, established by the Constitution, is one of
the three co-ordinate branches of the government.
Powers. The judicial power extends to all cases in law and
equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
States is a party, to controversies between two or more States,
between citizens of different States; between a State, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects, of
offenses against the laws of the United States.
By virtue of a decision of long sftinding, the Supreme Court
decides whether or not an Act of Congress is contrary to the
Constitution; and if so, declares the Act null. This power of
this Court makes it unique in the whole world. Of course this
power is exerciseed only in a case regularly instituted and com-
26 PRINCIPIA OF UA;W
ing before the Court for decision. While the Court has no
legislative function, the exercise of this power is a negation on
legislation.
The Court has original jurisdiction in all eases aifeeting am
bassadors other public ministers and consuls, and those in. which
a State shall be a party. In all other cases it has jurisdiction of
review.
Judges. The Court is composed of a Chief Justice of the
United States, and eight associate justices of the Supreme
Court. They, as well as all other United States judges are ap
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and hold
office during good behavior.
IMPEACHMENT.
The President, Executive Officers and Judges may be im
peached for misconduct in office. The trial is had by the Senate,
the Chief Justice presiding, on charges preferred by the House.
The votes of two-thirds of the Senators are requisite to convict.
Circuit Court of Appeals. The United States is divided into
nine circuits in each of which there is a court called the Circuit
Court of Appeals. The judge of this court associates wdtli him
self in the sessions of the court District Judges. The court has
jurisdiction of review in cases originating in the District Courts,
within the circuit.
District Courts. Each circuit is sub-divided into a number of
Judicial Districts for each of which is a judge. These courts
have original jurisdiction in matters cognisable by the Federal
Courts.
The powers and jurisdictions of the several United States
Courts will be more fully treated under the head of remedial
laws.
Having outlined the powers of the United States and its
(Government, it only remains to add that the government thus
created acts directly upon the inhabitants of the States. By an
amendment to the Constitution "citizen" of the United States
is defined and his status determined. Therefore citizenship of a
State gave the right to participate in the United States (Govern
ment. Since that amendment, one may be a citizen of the
United States who has no State citizenship. The States can not
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make any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States. One who is born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof is a
citizen of the United States and of the State where he resides.
A woman who has no State residence may become a citizen of
the United States.
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CHAPTER VI.
STATE GOVERNMENTS.
Each of the States composing the Union is, within her terri
tory, sovereign in all matters not, by the States and the people,
transferred to the United States. We have seen that where the
State renounces a sovereign power, it is not ipso facto conferred
upon the United States. It is a prerogative not conferred on
either goveniment. Though not exercisable it is resident in the
sovereign, viz: the people. There are therefore two sets of
limitations on the State Government, first, the powers delegated
to the United States, and second, the powers, renounced by the
States. Of the residue of sovereignty in the people of the
State a part only is conferred upon the State Government, as
appears in the State Constitution.
We recall that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States, the States entering into the Union had each
a government. Upon these State Governments the Government
of the United States was modelled. There is a general resemb
lance among all the State Governments, of the original thirteen
States, of the States admitted from the teerritories, and of
those annexed. While they differ in details, much that has been
eaid of the United States Government will help us in our study
of the State Governments.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
The frame and powers of the State Government are found in
t e State Constitutions. These are written statements of the
organic law. They are adopted by the people acting through
eir regularly elected delegates, and ratified by popuihr vote,
ihe adoption of a Constitution is a direcet political act of the
p^ple, the supreme act of the sovereign. Almost all of the
old States have, at various timcse since the year 1787, abrogated
eir Constitutions and adopted new ones, in the place of the
^^ssachusetts is an exception. Observers of our in-
s u ions make the comment, that the tendency seems to limit
by constitutional provisions tlie subjects of legislation. Much
ma er, w^ich is purely legislative, has been incorporated in the
recently framed Constitutions ofsome of the States. This would
seem to indicate a distrust of the legislature by the people, and
PRINCIPIA OF LAW 29
an intention to remove from the field of legislative operation
many subjects by embedding them in the fundamental law.
Whether a constitutional convention should do anything except
propose a constitution is a matter of speculation, their power
is undoubted. A constitutional convention of Georgia adopted
a code of laws, civil, criminal, and remedial.
STATE GOVERNMENTS.
Following the general model of government in this country,
each of the State Governments is composed of the three co-ordi
nate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial.
LEGISLATURE.
The law-making body of the State is called the Legislature
or the General Aessembly and is composed of two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The members of
both Houses are chosen by popular vote. The laws of the State
regulate the qualifications of voters. The Senators are fewer in
number than the members of the House. They are chosen by
the voters of senatorial districts into which the State is divided.
The members of the House are chosen by voters of counties or
or assembly districts. The number of members is apportioned
to population. Hence some counties have more members than
others less populous. The Legislature convenes at the State
Capital, at such times and for such length of time as the laws
provide. The sessions are usually annual, and in some States
they are biennial. All the members of the Legislature are
elected for two years. Each Legislature is a new body every
two years. The same general methods of enacting laws prevail
as o^btain in Congress. The Senate confirms or rejects ap
pointments of the Governor, and sits as a court in the Impeach
ment of certain State officers. The House originates the supply
bills.
In some States many officers are elected by the Leegislature,
judges of the courts, prosecuting officers, and others.
The general powers of the Legislature extend to the making
of all laws and ordinances consistent with the State Constitution,
and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,
which they may deem necessary and proper for the welfare of
the State. The limitations on the powers of the Legislature are
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usually euumerated in the Bill of Rights and consist of certain
rights of the individual, as set forth in the Constitution of the
United States, with such additions as each State has made.
The people of a State have the inherent, sole and exclusive right
to regulate their internal government and police, and to alter
and abolish their Constitution. The enumeration of rights in
the CoiLstitutjon does not deny to the people any inherent
rights which they have always enjoyed. The Legislature pro
vides for the levy and collection of taxes for the support of the
State Government, and enacts law for the creation and regu
lation of corporations, municipal and private.
GOVERNOR.
The executive power of the State Government is vested in a
Governor, and such other executive officers as are provided for
in the Constitution.
Governor. The Governor is the Chief Executive officer of the
State. The Constitution fixes the time and mode of his election,
the length of his term of office, his qualifications, also makes
provision for case of death or disqualification of the Governor.
Powers and Duties. The Governor is commander-in-chief of
the State forces. He has the power to grant reprieves and par
dons. He can veto an A^t of the Legislature. He appoints
officers as provided by the Constitution. Pills vacancies in
offices where there is no other provision for so doing. He com
municates to the Legislature information upon the state of the
commonwealth, recommends measures which he deems necessary
and expedient. He is charged with the general duty of seeing
that the laws are enforced.
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.
The number, names, powei^ and duties of the other executive
officers differ in the several States. Usually there are; a Secre
tary of State, a Treasurer, an Attorney General, an Accountant
General. Their qualifications, elections and duties are stated
in the Constitution of the State. The Secretary of State is the
keeper of the Great Seal, custodian of the archives and dis
charges other duties as provided. In some States he certifies to
the compliance with law of persons applying for incorporation,
and charters are passeed upon in his office. The Attorney
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General is the legal adviser of the executive department and
represents the State in litigation where its interest require it.
The Treasurer has charge of the public funds, disburses them
on the warrant of the Governor in accordance udth appropria
tions by the Legislature. The Accountant General, (Comp
troller General) audits all claims against the State, and allows or
disallows them. The books and accounts of the tax officers pass
under his supervision. The States have officers of the military,
agricultural and other departments. There are also officers of
the penitentiary, and of the asylums for the afflicted.
COURTS.
The judicial powers of the State are vested in the several
courts provided for in the Constitution. The court of last resort
is called the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. It has
jurisdiction of review of other courts and sometimes of appeal.
In perhaps all of the States there is a court of original and
general jurisdiction which is called by various names in the sev
eral States, the Superior Court, the Circuit Court, the General
Court and the like. It has exclusive jurisdiction in certain
matters, appelate jurisdiction over lower courts and general
original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, in law
and in equity with a few exceptions. There are also inferior
courts of counties. In some States there is a separate court of
probate and surrogate, in others, the jurisdiction is in the county
courts.
The States are divided into a great number of magisterial
districts, in each of which there is a court, usually called the
court of the Justice of the Peace, which has jurisdiction in minor
matters of contract and tort, and in some States in small criminal
cases.
The Constitution, powers and procedure of courts will be dis
cussed under remedial laws.
COUNTIES.
The States are subdivided into districts called counties in all
except Louisiana, where they are called parishes. Through the
counties, the State government impinges directly upon the in
dividual. The county officers are usually, sheriff, registrar, tax
receiver, tax collector, treasurer, county commissioners.
32 PRINCIPIA OF LAW
1. The Sheriff is the ministerial officer of the courts. He
makes arrests, serves processes, enforces judgments, executes
sentences, attends the sessions of the courts.
2. The Kegistrar is usually the clerk of the Circuit or Supe
rior Court. He is the keeper of the county records, registers
deeds, mortgages and other instruments, issues the processes and
makes minutes of the proceedings of the court.
3. The Tax Receiver makes a digest of taxable properties in
the county, and the taxes due thereon.
4. The Tax Collector gathers the taxes as they appear on the
digest, and turns in the money to the proper officers.
5. The Treasurer is the custodian of the county funds. He
disburses them on orders of the commissioners, makes reports
of his collections and expenditures.
6. The County Commissioners have charge of the fiscal affairs
of the county. They assess and expend the taxes, maintain the
highways and county buildings and properties. They are over
seers of the poor.
In a general outline of this sort it is not considered advisable
to attempt a treatment of municipal corporations. The govern
ments as originally framed contemplated a rural population.
The absence of provisions for the regulation of populations in
congested districts presents today many serious problems for
the law-maker and the statesman.
As this subject will be more fully treated under the head of
public corporations, it is sufficient here to mention only the
salient characteristics of these branches of government. Towns
cities, villages, (sometimes counties) are incorporated by the
Legislature as agencies of government. Certain powers of sov
ereignty are conferred upon them. They may adopt local law,
called ordinances, impose and collect taxes, establish courts,
arrest, try and punish offendere against the ordinances, maiu-
tain police force, provide for other officers nece.ssary to the
conduct of the municipal government. They are charged with
the supervision of ways, streets and bridges, with the protection
of the safety, health and property of the inhabitants.
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CHAPTER VII.
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.
The word people means a State in its collective and political
capacity. It is not synonimous with citizens nor with inhabitants.
There is little difference however between the meaning of the
expression body of citizens and people. The expression in the
Constitution of the United States, "We the people of the United
States" does not include all the inhabitants of the then territory,
slaves among others not being covered by the word people.
The inhabitants of the territory under the jurisdiction of the
United States are citizens, aliens, Indians, and Filipinos.
Citizens are: 1. Citizens of the United States. 2. Citizens
of a State. 3. Citizens who are qualified voters. 4. Citizens
who are not voters.
Aliens are: 1. Aliens resident in the territory of the United
States. 2. Aliens who vote in State and Federal elections.
Indians, Hiwaiians and Filipinos form classes apart.
CITIZENS OF THE UJHTED STATES.
Previous to the adoption of the amendment, the term citii.en
in the Constitution of the United States had no other meaning
than citizen of one of the States composing the Union. The
fourteenth amendment declares that all persons born or natura
lized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. Thenceforward there could be no doubt that there is a
Federal States. For how can one be a citizen except there be a
State of which he is citizen? Thus the citizen of a State occupies
a dual position. He is a citizen of the State and also a citizen
of the United States. Unus homo pluries personas sustinet.
He owes allegiance to two sovereignties.
The term person in a general sense includes corporation. A
corporation is not a citizen having any political capacity. Like
other persons, a corporation is entitled to the equal protection
of the laws and to the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the
laws.
There aj;^ two branches to the definition of a citizen of the
United States. First, the place of birth. Second, naturalization.
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First. Tlie first part of the definition seems to renew the
ancient common law definition of a British Subject. The child
of aliens, permanently resident in this country, born in the
United States is a citizen. The child of aliens temporarily in
this country is an alien. The international rule, the jus san-
guinis, that the allegiance of the child follows that of the parent
is not our law, but the common law rule, that the place of birth
fixes the allegiance, prevails.
The children of persons naturalized, coming to this country,
born before coming hither and before naturalization are aliens;
those born after coming to America, whether before or after
naturalization of parents, are citizens.
Second. Naturalization is the other method of acquiring
citizenship. At one time it was held that a subject could not
abjure his allegiance to his natural sovereign. Naturalization
is now well recognized by the laws of nations. The statutes of
the United States specify the manner of acquiring citizenship
by naturalization. The alien declares, before one of the courts
mentioned in the statute, two years before his admission, that
he intends to become a citizen. After five years residence in
this country, and one year's residence in the State, he abjures
allegiance to his sovereign, swears allegiance to the sovereignty
of this country, makes proof of good moral character. All this
is.made a matter of record in the court competent to admit. An
alien under the age of twenty-one years resident continuously
for three years may, after reaching majority, and after a resi-
rence of five years, be naturalized.
CITIZENS OP THE STATE,
The laws of each State will define citizenship of the State,
always with the proviso that any citizen of the United State.s
residing in a State is a citizen of that State. "While there are
citizens of the United States who are not citizens of any State,
it is probable that there is no citizen of a State who is not also a
citizen of the United States.
CITIZENS WHO ARE QU^VLIFIED VOTERS.
The right to vote is regulated by the laws of the States. The
qualifications differ in the several States. In all the States the
voter must be twenty-one years of age. In all the States periods
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of residence are required. In some the pajmient of taxes is a
requisite. In some a property or educational qualification is
made. In most of the States registration with officers of the law
is required. The States have the right to declare who can and
who cannot exercise the franchise of election. The only limi
tation upon this power is that no discrimination shall be made
on account of sex, race, color or ijrevious condition of servitude.
CITIZENS, NOT QUALIFIED VOTERS.
The right to vote does not necessarily belong to a citizen. It
is not one of the privileges or immunities guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States. This is self evident, when
we recall that in all of the States infants, and in most of them,
women were formerly denied the right to vote. !Members of
both of these classes are citizens. All citizens who are not
qualified under the laws of the State of which they are citizens
are denied the right to vote.
ALIENS RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
Persons resident or temporarily in the United States, who are
the subjects of another sovereignty, are aliens. They are en
titled to the protection of the laws, but do not participate in
government.
ALIENS WHO VOTE.
It is somewhat strange to note that in some of the States,
perhaps nine in all, voters need not be citizens of the United
States. In Nebraska an alien, who has declared his intention to
become a naturalized citizen thirty days before the election,
may vote.
INDIANS AND FILIPINOS.
Indian tribes within the territory of the United States are
alien though dependent powers. An Indian born within the ter
ritorial limits of the United States a member of and owing
immediate allegiance to his tribe is not a citizen of the United
States. He stands in the same position as a child of the subject
of a foreign government born within the dominion of that gov
ernment. An Act of Congre&s provides the method by which
an Indian may become a citizen.
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By the treaty of cession Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands
ceased tn be foreign country. They came under the complete
and absolute sovereignty and dominion of the United States and
so became territory of the United States over which civil gov
ernment could be established. The allegiance of the native in
habitants became due to the United States and they became
entitled to its protection. Since the cession Porto Rico has
been erected into a Territory of the United States and the in
habitants stand on the same footing as the inhabitants of the
other Territories. The Philippine Islands have been governed
by a commission. This has been partially superseded and many
of the rights of a Territory have been conferred on the in
habitants. The Vrgin Islands, acquired by purchase as also the
Hawaiian Islands, are in the same condition as the Philippines.
GENERAL NOTE.
Before leaving the subject of Government we may remark
that the law makes no distinction, as to individual rights, be
tween persons or classes of persons. It applies alike to public
officers and to private individuals. Nor is there any ecclesiastical
establishment. The laws governing religious soceties, associa
tions and corporations are the same as those regulating similar
lay bodies. The army, navy and militia are managed and pro
vided as already indicated.
Filipinos, who did not elect to retain Spanish allegiance, ob
tained by the treaty of lOth December, 1898, the international
status of citizens of the United States. They are not citizens in
the meaning of the Constitution, and until their status is estab
lished by Congress, they occupy an anomalous position of citizens
of the Philippine Islands.
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CHAPTER VIII.
PRIMARY RIGHTS OP INDIVIDUALS.
Human beings are found collected in societies. Many of the
members enter the society without volition on their part. It is
useless then to speculate about the natural liberties and rights
of man independent of society. There are certain rights so
generally recognized by free governments and wise systems of
laws that they are usually called the natural or absolute rights.
Without discussing whether these rights are derived to man
from Nature, and obseiwing that there are no absolute rights,
but only those conferred by law and limited by the rights of
others, we proceed to the elucidation of what we now call the
primary rights of an individual. We shall follow the order
mentioned in Chapter II.
SECURITY.
We take the several classes of the Right of Security in the
order mentioned.
1. Life. The highest right of an individual is to be secure
in his life. The violation of this right is called homicide, which
is the destroying the life of a human being of any age, sex, or
condition. The State has an interest in the life of each indi
vidual under the protection of her laws. The taking of human
life, unless justified or excused under some rule of law, is re
garded as a wrong against the State. Homicide, not justified
by law, is a high crime and is punished at the instance of the
State.
Although the person slain has had his highest right invaded,
it is evident from the very fact itself, that law can afford him
no redress, either of restitution or compensation, and none is
given to his representative. Formerly no one had a right to
bring a civil action at law on the killing of a human being.
The maxim is "actio personalis moritur cum persona." At
present the laws specify the parties who may maintain actions
for the killing of another. These are usually near relatives of
the person killed, who are considered in law to have such an
interest in the life of the deceased, as makes the killing an inva
sion of a legal right of such relative.
So highly is the right of life regarded that one is permitted to
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take the life of another, provided he cannot otherwise save his
own. This is called self-defense. The first law of Nature..
The term life means the natural life. Civil death is unknown
in this country. The term is usually taken to cover the period
from birth to death. For some purposes life is considered by
law to begin when the child quickens in the womb. The killing
of such unborn child is a crime punishable by law.
2. Limb. The right to possess and use unimpaired the limbs
and members of the body is guaranteed by law to all indi
viduals in civil society. The violation of this right is kno\m as
mayhem. Mayhem is both a private and a public wrong, both
a tort and a crime. Mayhem is the unlawfully depriving another
of the use of a limb or member.
Mayhem is a civil injury to the person maimed and the law
gives him an action for damages against the wrong doer. It is
also a crime varying in gravity from a capital felony, like
castration, to a misdemeanor, like biting the ear.
The old distinction whereby mayhem was confined to the
destruction or damaging of membei's useful in fighting is not
recognized generally by our laws. The mutilation or destruction
of any member of the body is mayhem.
The right of self defense of one's members sometimes extends
to the taking of the life of the assailant.
3. Body. The third primary right of security is the posses
sion of one's body free from hurt or invasion. Wounding, beat
ing, assaulting another, and perhaps a mere threat whereby
another is put in bodily fear or subjected to inconvenience, are
violations of this right. These are usually both crimes and torts,
and give rise to a prosecution by the State and an action for
damages by the person injured. The hurt or damage inflicted
is immaterial in determining the wrongful nature of the act.
Merely touching the body of another unlawfully is an invasion
of his right.
4. Health. The right which every one has to health is per
haps better comprehended by stating that the law imposes a
duty on each member of society to refrain from acts deleterious
to the health of another. Giving, selling, or furnishing unwhole
some food or drink, or any other article to be consumed, where
by the health of another is impaired or physical suffering caused
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is such a violation of this right as amounts to a crime, under the
laws of most of the States, and under the laws of all of them,
is an injury actionable in damages. Nuisance affecting in
juriously the health of another or causing him physical dis
comfort and inconvenience is a violation of this right. Such
nuisance may be the doing of something the person had no right
to do, or in failing to discharge a legal duty to another. It
may consist in exercising a right unconscionably, without a due
regard to the right of another. From the view point of the indi
vidual, nuisance is not a crime, but is a civil injury. The rela
tion of the individual to a public nuisance will he treated later
in the proper place.
5. Reputation. The law not only recognizes the right of every
individual to a good reputation, but goes a step further and
pre.sumes that every one has a good reputation. The reason
and necessity for this presumption will be more fully explained
later.
The right of reputation is invaded by libel and by slander.
These are false, malicious, defamatory publications concerning
another. The former is communicated through the eye, the
latter by way of the ear. The former consists of writing, signs,
pictures and the like. The latter is oral defamation. Publica
tion is complete when the defamatory matter is communicated
to one person other than the one defamed. Libel is a crime
and a tort, slander is a civil injury only. Both give a right of
action to the person defamed for the private wrong. Libel may
be criminally prosecuted.
LIBERTY.
1. Bodily Freedom. The right of free and unrestrained loco
motion is the birthright of all inhabitants of this country and is
fully guaranteed by all the constitutions. This right is violated
by false imprisonment, which consists in restraining one of his
liberty by actual force or otherwise. The injury is complete
when one, even without violence and on the highway, compels
another to go or remain against his will. A fortiori incarcera
tion in a house or elsewhere is a violation of this right. Duress,
whereby one is compelled unwillingly to submit to another,
when not accompanied with acts of physical force, but is ac
complished by threats only, is called duress per minas and is
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false imprisonment. We have already mentioned the provision
of the Constitution of the United States in reference to the
writ of Habeas Corpus. This is a summary proceeding, where
by one restrained of his liberty can immediately have a hearing
and investigation by an officer of the law as to the grounds of
his detention, and should the imprisonment be unlawful he may
be at once set at large.
2. Religion. Religious liberty is a right of the individual
not to be invaded by the government or by an individual. Every
one has the right to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, or not to worship a Supreme Being at all. To
engage in immoral, indecent, scandalous or unlawful practices
under the pretense of religious worship is not within the bounds
of religious liberty.
3. Labor. The right to engage in lawful occupation for
pleasure, gain, or to support existence is undoubtedly a branch
of the right of liberty. While the right to refuse to labor for
any particular person or to engage in any particular kind of
work is undoubted, and the right to be idle, under certain cir
cumstances, is fully recognized, any act whereby the right to
engage in work is interfered with is clearly a violation of this
right of individual liberty.
4. Speech. The right to discuss orally or in writing any and
all matters of a public nature, to express one's opinions or be
liefs without let or hindrance is fully recognized. This right,
like all other rights, must be exercised under the regulations and
restrictions of law, and with a due regard to the rights of others.
Thus, there is no censorship of the press. One may print and
publish in a newspaper a defamatory statement of another. But
if the statement is false, he violates the law and is liable crimi
nally and civilly, for the crime and tort of libel.
5. Family Relation. The right to marry and form the family
relation is a primary right of the individual. The exercise of
the right in each case is subject to the laws governing it. Thus
persons under the age prescribed by law, persons who are re
lated to each other within the degrees of kinship forbidden by
law, and under other legal disabilities, are not permitted to
marry.
6. Contract. The right to make contracts allowed by the law
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falls more properly under the head of the right of property.
Contracts to perform labor and services, marriage contracts, and
other contracts not involving the transfer and devolution of
lands or chattels belong under the head of the right of liberty.
The freedom of contract marks the degree of advancement of a
human society. The growth of this right is the movement of man
from law to liberty.
The invasions of the rights above enumerated are called in
law wrongs, they are either public or private, in other words
are either crimes or torts. They will be more fully treated under
those heads. They are mentioned at this point for the purpose
of explaining the rights and by way of illustration.
Pursuing the order above mentioned, we postpone the dis
cussion of the third primary right, viz: property, to the treat
ment of civil rights and of private relations.
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CHAPTER IX.
CIVIL RIGHTS.
Civil and political rights, in the broad sense, comprehend
all the rights of a member of civil society. These are enumerated
in the Constitution, and are generally covered by the provisions,
that, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privi
leges and immunities of citizens in the several States. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or propei'ty without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
The primary and relative rights are discussed generally in the
proper place. At this point the term civil rights is used in the
narrow sense applicable to rights growing out of legislation
forbidding discrimination against negroes.
1. Right to Vote. The Constitution of the United States
having conferred citizenship on the negro, provided further
that, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." All
laws defining the qualifications of voters must apply equally to
negroes and to members of other races. A State may require
a property, educational, or other qualification, and if it apply
without discrimination to all citizens it is Constitutional. This
provision of the Constitution mentions specifically the right to
vote.
2. The Right to Hold Office. If not within the letter of this
provision, this right is clearly covered by the prohibition against
abridgement of privileges. The right to vote and hold office is
a privilege of a citizen of the United States, who meets the
qualifications made by the State and not otherwise, the sole
restriction on the power of the State being discrimination.
The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
confers the right to vote upon women, under the usual State
regulations.
3. Highways, Public Buildings. The right to use the high
ways and public buildings is clearly guaranteed to all persons
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under the protection of the laws, whether citizens or not. Like
all rights they are exercisable according to reasonable regulations
of Federal, State, Municipal Governments. Public parks stand
on the same footing with highways.
4. Education. There is no duty incumbent on the State to
provide for education. Where the State makes provision for
education out of the public funds ,it is unconstitutional to deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal participation in
the benefits. "No right is violated when colored pupils are
merely placed in different schools, provided the schools are
equal, and the same measure of privilege and justice is given lo
each."
5. Public Utilities. There are certain kinds of business of a
public nature in which the members of the community have
rights which do not exist in the ease of a purely private busi
ness. Typical of these is the business of a common carrier. A
common carrier, as a rule, has rights and powers over highways
which are prerogatives of the sovereign, and consequently is
held to duties greater than those imposed on one engaged in a
private enterprise. The right to operate a railroad, for example,
is a franchise, a branch of the prerogative in the hands of pri
vate person. Hence any discrimination made by sucli a carrier
is to some extent the act of the State. If discrimination is based
on race or color it is in contravention of the constitutional pro
vision.
Again it may be said that it is competent for a State or for a
carrier to require the separation of races. The setting asid.- cf
carriages for the exclusive use of women, or of persons of color
is permissible.
Innkeepers and others engaged in like business designed to
serve the public come under a different rule from common car
riers. Under the common law of England they were bound to
accommodate without discrimination persons who offered them
selves as patrons. Some States have made laws requiring inn
keepers, managers of theatres and persons engaged in similar
businesses to serve their patrons without discrimination as to
race. Whether or not the same is imperative in States which
have not adopted such rules is uncertain. It must be remem
bered that the constitutional prohibition as to discrimination is
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upon the State and not upon the individual. It is only when the
act is an act of the State or can be attributed to the State that
it comes within the provisions of the Constitution of the United
States.
In all cases whether of carriere, innkeepers or of others en
gaged in similar occupations, it is perfectly competent to make
reasonable rules for the conduct of their several businesses, to
refuse to accommodate objectionable individuals, such as drunk
en, crazy and diseased persons. The law* does not require that
the same treatment be accorded to all, but that equal treatment
be given to all, and especially that no discrimination be made on
account of color.
Other instances of public utilities are found in the businesses
of telegraph, telephone companies, keepers of public baths, bar
ber shops, eating houses.
6. Other Civil Rights. Usually classed as civil rights are
some others mentioned in the Bill of Rights; to assemble peacea
bly, to petition for the redress of grievances, to have and carry
arms. The laws regulate the reasonable exercise of these rights.
As to the last, it provides that to carry arms at specified times
and places and in a certain manner is forbidden.
There are perhaps other civil rights, but these mentioned are
sufficient as examples at least to suggest them to the student.
Civil Rights Laws. The fourteenth amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States forbids any State to make or
enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges and im
munities of the citizens of the United States. The Congress
made it criminal for any person to deny to any citizen, on
account of race or color, the full and equal enjoyment of the
privileges and acoommodations of inns, public conveyances,
theatres and other places of public amusement. The constitu
tional prohibition is upon the State not on the individual. This
law exceeds the power granted to Congress and is uneonstitu-
tional. Some States have adopted this law, most of them have
not done so. In many of the States equal and separate accom
modation is required.
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CHAPTER X.
PRIVATE RELATIONS.
The outline of government necessarily indicates the relation of
the individual to the public. "VVe now come to the relations of
individuals io each other. These may be profitably grouped
under three heads, legal, contractual and domestic.
1. Legal Relations. The first class comprehends the legal
rights of the individual and the reciprocal duties of other mem
bers of civil society to respect those rights. The treatment of
this group of relations is to be found in no one separate place.
It permeates the whole discussion of the substantive law of legal
rights and civil injuries, and, in some of its phases, of rights and
obligations imposed by reason of the existence of a contract.
2. CoNTRACTU^vL RELATIONS. So far as they affect property,
these will be discussed under a separate head, viz: contracts.
Contracts not touching property have already been mentioned.
3. Domestic Relations. The third class of private relations
covers the domestic relations. The rights, duties, powers, privi
leges and disabilities of the parties to these relations inter sese
and to strangers are regulated by the law of the relation. This
is called status. This terra is usually used in contradistinction
to contract. The rights, duties and obligations of parties to a
contract are determined primarily by the terms of the contract.
To illustrate, a man and a w'oman take each other for husband
and wife. They enter into a contract of marriage. There are
no expressed terms, beyond the mere consent. Immediately the
laws of the relation of husband and wife become applicable.
The relation is now one of status. The husband is responsible
for debts contracted by the wife for her support. The contract
is silent as to this liability, the status fixes it. The enlarged
power of making contracts, voluntary agreements, enacting in
each case little laws governing the transaction, the movement
from status to contract marks the advance of human society
from law to liberty. In ancient societies one's place and rights
were fixed in almost all instances by law. One was born vassal
or lord, bond or free, subject or alien. He was thus bound and
directed by laws throughout life. The freedom of contract
largely alters this condition.
J '16 PRINCIPIA OF LAW
It should always be remembered that the freedom to contract is
bounded by the general provisions of law. "Within these limits
the power to contract is unlimited.
As generally undei*stood the domestic relations are those of;
Master and Servant, Husband and Wife, Parent and Child,
Guardian and AVard.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS.
Some writers hold the opinion that the relation of master and
servant is one of contract and not of status. In support of our
position in .classing it under status, we give one concrete ex
ample. The contract between a railway corporation and an
employee may be silent on the subject of torts to passengers,
or may expressly forbid such torts. The right of a passenger,
injured by an employee, to recover damages from the corpora
tion is controlled by the law of the relation of master and
servant, and not by the terms of the contract.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
This unimportant domestic institution has, in modern times,
become one of the most important branches of the law. Upon
the rules governing it are founded most of the rules of liability
of corporations for torts. The relation is further important
because it is the type of the other three. The rights and obli
gations of the fii'st person in the other three are frequently those
of a master; of the second person, those of a servant. When
ever one person acquires the right to control the acts of another
the relation of master and servant arises. This relation ordi
narily originates on a contract of employment. The contract
serves to fix the rights of the master and servant toward each
other, and to define the extent of the servant's authority. We
usually look to the contract to ascertain whether the act is
within the scope of the servant's powei^ and duties. Servants
are, in many particulars, agents of the master, but the relation
of master and servant differs widely from that of principal and
agent. One is status, the other is contract.
1. Kinds op Servants. The old clas-sification of servants, as
stewards, factors, bailiffs, apprentices, laborers, and menials, is
no longer useful. It served to indicate the manner in which the
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relation originated, whether by being born a vassal or serf, or
by agreement. The apprentice deserves to be mentioned. He is
bound by articles to the master, usually for the purpose of learn
ing a trade. He is subject to the control of the master in certain
particulars, which have diappeared as to the other kinds of
servants in modern times.
EFFECT UPON THE PARTIES.
1. Rights of Masters. The master has a property in the
services of the seiwant. One who entices, beats, maims, or other
wise incapacitates the seiwant inflicts an injury upon the master.
He may bring an action against the wrongdoer for damages
per quod servitium amisit. Of coui'se the servant has his action
against one wdio wrongs him, independent of the relation.
2. Power op Master. The master has power to control the
conduct of the servant in the discharge of his duties. Except in
the case of an apprentice, this power does not extend to corporal
chastisement or coercion. Upon this power depends the liability
of the master for the servant's acts. It would seem then that
he should be armed with larger powers than he, at present, has.
3. Duties of Master. The master is bound to protect the
servant while in the discharge of his duties, from all unreason
able risks and dangers which his superior knowledge and position
would presumably enable him to prevent. Apprentices must be
humanely treated, must be taught a trade, and must be reason
ably provided for at the expiration of the term of service.
4. Rights op Servants. The servant has the right to require
of the master the faithful performance of the duties above
mentioned. He is entitled to receive wages, either as agreed
in the contract of employment, or as a fair compensation for
the work done. "Wages are collectable, like any other legal
claim, by an action at law.
effect upon strangers.
1. Mutual Rights. Formerly the law permitted the master to
maintain the servant in a law suit; also the master might justify
an assault in defense of the seiwant; and the seiwant could
justify an assault in defense of the master. The growth of
the relation from a domestic to a commercial one renders these
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views unimportant, if not obsolete. These mutual rights still
exist in the case of an apprentice.
2. Responsibility op Master. The responsibility imposed by
law upon the master for the conduct of the servant depends
primarily upon the principle expressed in the maxim, "qui facit
per alium, facit per se."
(a). An act done by the seiwant at the command, express or
implied of the master is in law an act of the master. Example:
Should the master order the seiwant to open a ditch, whereby
damage accrues to another's land, and a right of action arises
in that other, the master is responsible for the injury.
(b). So likewise an act done by a servant within the regular
scope of his duties, in the usual course of his employment. Is
the act of the master. Example. A banker's clerk, whose duty
is to collect money, embezzles the money collected from a
customer. The loss falls on the banker and not upon the
customer. It would be the other way, if the servant was not
the collector for the banker.
(c). An act done by the servant while on the actual business
or errand of the master is the master's act. Example. A
coachman, going to the railway station to meet the master's
guest, carelessly drives over and hurts a man, the master is
responsible for the injury. If the coachman carelessly hurt
one, while using his master's vehicle for his own purposes, this
is the act of the coachman and is not attributable to the master.
The three instances given are explained by applying the
maxim, and perhaps all cases of repondeat superior might be
explained in the same manner. Where, however, the master
is held liable for an act of the seivant expressly or impliedly
forbidden some confusion might arise, and therefore it is ex
pedient to state the rule of liability more fully. The master
has the right to control the acts of the servant in a particular
employment or generally. This right of control imposes on
him the duty to control. P-or torts committed by the servant
through failure of the master to control his acts, the master is
responsible. It is not sufficient for the master to give orders,
he must see that they are obeyed. And further the master
commands an act, which it was his duty to prohibit. Cases of
this sort usually arise where the master owes to another or tc
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the public special or peculiar duties, tlie performance of which
he commits to servants. Examples. The conductor of a rail
way train receives instruetious as to the proper care and treat
ment of passengers. He violates his orders and maltreats a
pas.seuger, the corporation, his master, is held liable for the
injury.
Again, the servant of an innkeeper steals from a guest, the
innkeeper is responsible. In the former case the servant dis
obeyed the express, in the latter the implied command of the
master.
The liability of the master for a contract made by his servant
depends more usually on the law of agency, but there are many
instances wherein the doctrine of master and servant control.
A wife buys necessaries for the family, the contract is the
husband's and he must pay.
This subject will be further noticed under the heads of torts
and contracts.
FELLOW SERVANTS.
The ancient doctrine that the master is not responsible for
a tort committed by a servant upon his fellow-servant, has
been radically modified by statute of the United States and of
some of the States. In some kinds of employment the doctrine
has been practically abolished. The matter more appropriately
belongs to the subject of torts, and will there be noticed. The
present state of the laws grows out of the duty of the master
to provide the servant a safe place to work, to furnish him
safe and proper tools. It follows that as a drunken or in
competent fellow servant is a dangerous and improper imple
ment, injury inflicted by such servant upon a feUow servant is
the act of the master.
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CHAPTER XI.
HUSBAND AND WIPE.
This relation arises on the consummation of the contract of
marriage. The common law regarded marriage purely as a
civil contract. Among other results of this view was that the
contract having once lawfully been consummated, it could not
be annulled. The Ecclesiastical Courts might, on a case made,
declare that the impediments, known as canonical disabilities,
existing at the time of the attempted marriage were sufficient
to render the contract void ab initio, and thus bastardise the
issue. Until such decree however, the marriage was voidable
and not void.
This is an excellent illustration of the difference between a
void, and a voidable transaction. Where parties, or either of
them labored under civil disabilities and attempted to inter
marry, it was simply a void proceeding, and the intercoui*se
was meretricious, not matrimonial.
There being no divorce in the English Civil Courts, the at
tempted marriage was disregarded. Where canonical impedi
ment existed at the time of marriage, the contract was voidable,
and if no decree was had during the lifetime of the parties, it
was valid and the issue was legitimate. If the matter were
brought to the attention of the Ecclesiastical Courts a decree
might be had declaring the voidable contract void ab initio,
as having never been legally entered into. All persons may
disregard a void act. Usually one person only may claim avoid
ance of a voidable transaction.
MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
1, Nature. While our law regards marriage as a contract,
it is looked upon as a peculiar kind of contract.
(a). The parties or either of them cannot disregard it at
their option, and as in case of other contracts, take the conse
quences of an action at law.
(b). The laws of all the States, except one,.provide methods
of annulling this contract and fixing the after relations of the
parties. This latter is the radical difference between divorce
under our laws and under the old English system.
2. Requisites. The requisites of the marriage contract differ
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in the several States. "We can only speak generally on the sub
ject.
(a). Disabilities. All individuals not laboring under dis
abilities are capacitated to contract. The disabilities are usually
nearness of relationship by consanguinity or affinity, existing
marriage, idiocy, impotency, insanity, non-age. The period of
non-age differs in the different jurisdictions, and is different in
the male and in the female. This disability would not always
render the marriage void. Consent of parent or guardian
obviates it.
3. Consummation. The mode of consummating marriage is
set forth in the statutes. The laws usually direct the procure
ment of a license or the publication of banns, the assent of the
parties in words of the present tense, in the presence of an
officer authorized by law to administere an oath or of a minister
of the gospel. Some or all these provisions may be mandatory,
and some or all of them may be directory. Failure to comply
with a mandatory provision renders the attempted marriage
void. Non-compliance with a directory provision may subject
the parties or the officer to pains and penalties, but does not
vitiate the transaction. As has been said, in some jurisdictions,
all these provisions are directory, and persons, capable of inter
marrying, who cohabit and recognize each other as man and
wife are considered such by law. This is called a common law
marriage, because no such marriage was recognized as common
law. When the statutory provisions are followed the marriage
is complete. "Consensus non concubitus facit nuptias.
EFFECT OF MARRIAGE.
Anciently on the consummation of the contract there was a
merger of identity. The woman ceased to exist in law. There
was but one person, and the husband was that person. By
consequence the woman's personality vested absolutely in the
husband, her realty vested in him sub modo, her choses in
action were subject to his martial rights. He became liable for
her ante-nuptial debts. Torts and crimes (except treason and
felony) committed by the mfe, were in law the acts of the
husband. Debts contracted by her for necessaries were his not
hers. Ante-nuptial debts between them were cancelled. They
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could not testify for or against each other. They could not
inter-contract.
There have been radical modifications of these rules in modern
laws. For many purposes the wife's separate pei-sonality is
recognized. Yet where the statutes have not made a change
the old rules prevail. A revolution in the laws of married
women's property rights has taken place. The rules on the
subject vary all the way from a near approach to the common
law to the statement that, "all properties of the woman at the
time of her marriage, and all properties given to, or inherited,
or acquired by her shall remain her separate property, and not
be liable for the debts of her husband." There is a curious
restriction on her powers under some systems of laws. She
may do anything with her own except pay her husband's debts.
Her promise to do this is a nullity, and money used for that
purpose may be recovered by her.
Note. The history of a married woman's property rights
aptly illustrates the corelation of law and laws, the immutability
of the former and the adaptability of the latter. The principle
is that the woman should have the enjoyment of her own. Time
was when might was the measure of enjoyment and a woman's
properties could be secured to her only under the protection,
coverture, of a man. As civilization advances the enjoyment
by the woman of her own is better attained by giving her the
power to control. Thus the principle remains the same, the
application must change as conditions change to insure accord
and to promote justice.
In other respects than property, the effects of marriage have
been modified. The wife is now responsible for crimes and can
be prosecuted separately. She is responsible for such torts
committed by her as are not imputable to her husband under
the rules of master and servant. As the husband was held re
sponsible for the wife's acts, it was anciently the rule that he
could control her, even to the extent of physical correction. So
far from this being the modern view, it is now a crime for a
husband to strike his mfe. In the prosecution of this crime, the
wife is a competent witness. Husband and wife, under the old
law, being one person, could not give evidence for or against
each other in court. "Nemo in propria causa testis esse debet,"
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and "Nemo tenetur seipsum aceusare." This prohibition is
now removed in civil causes, but is yet of force in a criminal
prosecution against either, except in the instances expressly
allowed by statute.
From the foregoing we may summarize, that the husband is
the head of the family, has control in many matters of the
wife s acts, is in duty bound to support the wife, is liable for
some of her torts. We see that in many important particulars
the wife's separate personality is recognized. She controls her
properties, is responsible for debts, torts and crimes, and may
prosecute her husband.
DI^OLUTION OF RELATION.
This relation is dissolved, by the death of either party, or by
divorce.
Divorce. The laws of every State in the Union, except one,
recognize divorce and confer on the courts the power to annul
the contract of marriage.
1. Kinds. The two kinds of divorce are, a vineulo matrimonii,
which annuls the tie; and a mensa et a toro, which is a legalized
separation. This latter does not annul the contract.
2. Effect. . The total divorce breaks the contract, dissolves
the relation, and restores the parties to the positions they legally
occupied before marriage. The issue is legitimate, being born
in wedlock. Ordinarily the custody of infant offspring is pro
vided for, and a settlement of the properties between the parties
is had.
3. Grounds. The grounds for divorce are so various in the
different States that it is impracticable to review them.
(a). Imperative. A divorce may be claimed as a matter of
right on any of the legal' incapacities at the time of the marriage,
a voidable contract being thus avoided; or on the ground of
adultery, desertion, or other ground, thus breaking a valid
contract.
(b). Discretionary. The court and jury have discretion to
grant divorce on grounds .specified in the statutes, ranging all
the way from non-support, cruel treatment and the like to in
compatibility of temper. The grounds for a separation are not
usually specified, but are to be judged of in each case.
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ALIMONY.
Pending a divorce or at tlie time of the decree, the court may
compel the husband to pay to his wife money called alimony,
for the support of herself and infant children. Prior to the
decree it is temporary, after the decree, it is permanent alimony.
Temporary alimony is awarded as a matter of course, inde
pendent of the merits of the divorce proceeding. It includes
her expenses and counsel fees. Permanent alimony is appor
tioned in amount to the condition in life and financial ability
of the parties. It may be ordered paid in a single sum in full
settlement or in instalments. Alimony may vary in amount
from a few dollars per month from a negro laborer, to a million
dollars from a wealthy man.
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CHAPTER XII.
PARENT AND CHILD.
This relation arises from nature, and the rules governing the
same are in a strict sense the laws of status.
Children are ligitimate or Bastard. A legitimate child is one
born in lawful wedlock, or within the usual period of gestation
after wedlock ends. This presumption of law may be rebutted
by proof, and children boni in wedlock of adulterous inter
course, may be shown to be illegitimate. The presumption pre
vails unless the contrary be established by proof. The pre
sumptions of law are in favor of legitimacy, innocence, honesty,
sanity, legal capacity, and official duty discharged. The con
trary must be established in each case in order to overcome the
presumption.
Provision is usually made in the statues that the intermar
riage of the bastard's parents legitimate him. There are also
methods of legitimating bastards, by proceedings for that pur
pose and by adoption.
PARENT s DUTY.
The father of a legitimate child, and if the father be dead,
the mother, Ls bound to support, protect and educate him until
he reaches his majority. This age of majority is twenty-one
years. The disabilities of infancy are partially removed by
statute at successive periods before majority, and parental pow
ers and duties decrease pari passu.
1. Support. During infancy the father must provide the
necessaries of life for the child, suitable to his condition. The
term necessaries must be interpreted to suit the facts of each
case. To declare and fix a sum of money would be to permit
gross injustice to be done in many eases, and would inflict
hardship on the parent in others. In order that the law may
preserve the proper rigidity, as a rule, and at the same time be
sufficiently elastic to be adaptable to all cases, the interpretation
is said to be reasonable.
2. Protection. The right rather than the duty of the parties
to this relation mutually to protect each other i.s fully recognized
in all systems of laws. The parent or the child may justify
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assault, nay even homicide, in defense each of the other, under
circumstances where a mere stranger would be guilty.
3. Education. It is the duty of the parent to afford the child
such education as his means warrant.
The duty to support is absolute and is enforcable at law.
The duty to educate is nearer a moral than a legal obligatiou
and is not compulsory. Protection is scarcely a duty. It is
more a permissive right.
Reciprocal of the parent's duty to support is the child's right
to a support. This is a right of perfect obligation, because it is
compulsory under the law. The right to an education is one of
imperfect obligation, because not enforceable at law.
P.:UiENTAL POWER.
The father's powers are, as follows:
1. Wages. To receive the wages of the child. As he is
charged with the child's support, this right follows logically.
There are in many States laws forbidding the employment of
children at labor under certain age. These laws are statutory
restrictions on parental power.
2. Control. To control the conduct of the child, even to the
extent of corporal correction. "Molliter manus imponere."
The father being held responsible in law for the acts of the
child, it is of the essence of the relation that he should have the
power to control those acts.
3. Guardian. To appoint, under certain conditions, a guar
dian for the child, who will stand in loco parentis. He can also
confer temporary parental power on school teachers and tutors
The father being dead, parental powers and obligations pass
to the mother. Parental power may be lost by voluntary sur
render, either to the child or to another. The parental power
may be taken away by a proceeding at law, for such causes as
cruelty, non-support and rearing the child in vicious or immoral
surroundings.
parent's liability.
1. Contracts. As it is the duty of the parent to support the
child, the law permits the child, in case the parent fail in this
duty, to contract for the necessarie.s of life, and the contract is
binding on the parent. The parent i.s the proper party to decide
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upon the sufBcieney of the support he furnishes, and he is not
liable for anything over and above. "Wlien the parent fails to
furnish the necessaries, and he is compelled to pay for them
furnished by another, they must be reasonable and suited to the
condition of the parent and the child. The term necessaries,
of course, include food, clothing, medicine.
The right of the child to an education is peculiar, and marks
a change in the relation from former views on that subject. If
the parent fail to educate the child, the latter has no redress at
law therefor.
2. Torts. The parent is liable for the torts committed by
the child, under the same conditions and rules as impose re
sponsibility on the master for the torts of his servants. In all
transactions where the law of the relation imposes a duty on the
parent to control the act of the child, and the father's failure
to control, enables the child to perpetrate the wrong, the parent
is liable.
BASTARDS.
Bastards are children born out of lawful wedlock, or under
such circumstances as are sufficient to overcome the legal pre
sumption of legitimacy. Proof that the child is the issue of
adulterous intercourse, continued absence of husband during
the period of gestation, birth at time beyond the period of
gestion after a divorce, birth during a separation a mensa et
a toro, are instances of illegitimacy. In case of continued absence
of husband the presumption of legitimacy exists until removed.
If no case be made, the issue is legitimate. In case of a separa
tion, the law presumes obedience to the decree, and the issue is
bastard.
Formerly a bastard had no rights except those acquired by
him, in other words he had no heritable blood. Descent was
conveyed only through the male line, and the ba.stard had no
father, he was filias nullius.
At present the bastard may inherit from his mother. In
some States he stands in the same position as other offspring
of the mother, and his collateral kinsmen by the mother may
inherit from him.
The bastard takes his mother's name. He has all the rights
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of acquisition of properties and the contiol theieof as other
men have and allhis political rights are comp e e.
The laws have always provided that the father of a bastard
. ...a. i.jw. Tins IS to nroteet the nnh-
a ci ,
shall he compelled to support him. This is to pro^ct the pub
lic from the charge of supporting the hastai;d The ordinary
method is to compel the father to give bond for the support
through the machinery of a bastardy warrant.
EIGHTS .VND DUTIES OP CHILD.
• inThe rights of the child have been sufdciently indicated
what has already been said, when speaking of the parent.
The infant child owes obedience to the parent, is subject to
parental control, the fruit of his labor belonp to the parent.
Parental power ends at the majority of the child. After reach
ing majority, the child owes no legal duty to support the parent.
PRINCIPIA OF LAW 59
CHAPTER Xm.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
This relation is a species of artificial parentage created by
law. The ward is an infant. Infants are not recognized in law
for many purposes, and must be represented by one sui juris.
So far as the control of the conduct of the infant is coneerned,
the parent is the guardian, and is called the natui'al guardian.
Where the infant has a separate estate or where it is necessary
for the infant to be represented in court, a guardian is ap
pointed under the proper proceeding at law.
The guardian thus appointed is the parent if alive, if not,
then such person as the statute directs. "Where the parent is
dead, the guardian controls both the person and the estate of
the infant. In the former capacity, he is in loco parentis, in
the latter, lie is a trustee.
The parent may by will designate the guardian. The infant,
on reaching the age specified in the statute (fourteen years)
may choose his guardian. Whenever lands or chattels come into
the hands of the guardian, he.must be appointed by the proper
officer of the law, must give bond for the faithful discharge of
his trust, and must make reports to the proper officer of his
actings and doings.
NECESSITY FOR GUARDIAN.
The disabilities under which, infants labor necessitate a guar
dian. These are generally, inability to contract, and to appear
in court.
1. Contracts. The general rule is that an infant can make
no binding contract. The exceptions to the rule are contracts
for necessaries and for education. The difference bet\\ een the
infant's contract for necessaries, and the instances where he
may bind his parent by contract for necessaries must be kept
in mind. One is the infant's contract, the other is the parent's
contract.
2. Court Procedure. In matters in court the infant must
appear through his guardian, touching his lands and chattels.
An infant may bring an action at law, but it must proceed in
the namd of a person sui jm-is, certainly if objection be made.
"Where the cause of action is personal injury, the action pro-
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eeeds in the name of a person sui juris, for the infant's use.
This person is the next friend, prochein ami. On a recovery
being had, the prochein ami on receiving the fund, gi"vos bond
and is governed by the rules in case of a regularly appointed
guardian.
PRIVILEGES OF INFANCY.
1. Contracts. As the infant is incapacitated to contract,
he may defend an action brought against him on contract, on
the ground of infancy. This is a personal privilege and must
be specially claimed.
"Where an infant has received a benefit under a contract, ful
filled by the other party, he must return the benefit or compen
sate for it.
2. Torts. Infants are liable for their torts, and may be sued
accordingly. It is not permissible to render an infant liable
for a contract by bringing the action in tort for negligence.
The subject will be further noticed under Torts.
3. Grimes. Infants under the age specified in the statute are
considered incapable of forming the criminal intent and there
fore incapable of committing a crime. At common law an in
fant under seven years of age was incapable of crime, over
fourteen years of age he was doli capax, between those ages,
the facts of each ease controlled. The question turned upon
whether the infant on trial was or was not doli capax.
AGE OF MAJORITY.
Infancy continues up to the age of twenty-one years. This
age is reached on the morning of the day preceding the twenty-
fii-st anniversary of birth. This rule follows from the rule that
there are no parts of a day in law. The period from midnight
to midnight is an unit.
We may say in passing that the periods of time covered by
the words, day, month, year are specified in the statutes. If
not so specified, the common law computation prevails.
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CHAPTER 5IV.
PROPERTY.
Property is the third great primary right of the individual.
It is strange that it should ever have been considered a natural
right. In fact it owes its existence to human society, is highly
artificial, and exhibits startling variations and contradictions at
different periods in the laws of civilzed peoples. In its complete
sense it is the last of the primary rights to be recognized.
Observation of man in the tribal state, in village communes,
convince us that as we look backward along the line of march
from savagery to civilization, the idea of property grows.more
dim. "We are justified in believing that there was a time when
all things capable of ownership were at large. Occupancy alone
gave right, and occupancy and property were coextensive. So
long as the one continued, the other existed; when the former
ceased, the latter was gone. The origin of right, separate from
possession, began with personalty. The exclusive use of flocks
and herds gave property therein. When the expenditure of
labor in caring for them and in increasing their value was added
the highest and surest foundation of the right was reached.
Naturally followed the right of disposition and as naturally the
succession by the kindred of the owner when he abandoned them
at death. Thus personalty when the actual occupancy ceased,
no longer went back into the common, subject to be seized by
the first taker. There are today certain things which from
their nature are subject to this early notion, such as animals
farae naturae, air, water, literary productions.
' That land was common and not the subject of individual
owneship is evident from the history of peoples in primitive
state of advancement. The Indian tribes in America held their
lands in common. In India thei'e are ihstanees of community
ownership. The inhabitants of northern Europe, even after
they became settled, redistributed the lands at stated inteiwals.
As civilization advanced the recognition of the individual right in
one to habitation by him constructed, to lands by him reclaimed,
grew. 'Society recognized the right as it evolved and laws pro
tected the individual ownership of chattels and of lands, includ
ing enjoyment and disposition, regulating the succession at
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death, and providing for the return to the Society itself in de
fault of an individual owner.
The true origin of property is the enhancement of the value
of a thing by labor expended upon it, this is something which
man has made which is his own. The other recognized origin
among ancient peoples is conquest. This exists today not in the
individual, but in the Society itself. The only relic of it is
sailors' prize money.
This rough outline sufficiently indicates that property is in no
sense a natural right, but is the creature of organized society.
It is fully protected by the laws of all civilized peeoples. It is
a maxim of government that "all things capable of ownership
shall have an owner designated by law." Things in individual
ownership cannot be taken by the sovereignty itself except on
just compensation made.
Property has already been defined and its elements have been
mentioned. The term is loosely used to mean either the right
or the thing in which the right exists. Thus land is spoken of
as real property. It is correct to speak of the land as realty,
and one's property therein as the interest or estate. So likewise
the property in a chattel is not the chattel itself, but the right
of dominion over the chattel. It is suggested that clearness
may be attained by using the term property to mean the right,
and by designating all possible subject-matter of property as
properties. We shall see that more than one individual may
have a property or proprietary right in the same subject-matter
at the same time. Complete property has all the elements here
tofore mentioned, should any of them be wanting, there may be
a qualified property.
PROPERTIES.
The subject-matter of property is divided into two groups,
viz: realty and personalty. There are certain species of proper
ties which are not strictly real nor personal, and hence are
known as mixed. These require no separate treatment, but will
he noticed along with the two well defined species. Of these
first in order we take up realty.
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REALTY.
1. Land. Land is tlie general name for realty or things real.
By this term is meant anything fixed, permanent, immovable.
It includes the surface of the earth and all things permanent
above and below, from the centre of the earth indefinitely up
ward. "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad eoelum." It is
a violation of of right amoiinting to a trespass to intrude upon
the land of another, either on the surface, or by subterranean
excavations, or by overhanging with buildings, trees, or even by
passing over the same in flying machines or otherwise. "Water
on land is subject to the use of the owner, if it escape from the
land, it cannot be regained. We speak of so much land covered
by water. Trees and other natural growth on land are a part
thereof. Everytliing permanently included in lateral boundaries
is land. Hence it has been called a definite part of space, so as
to cover soil, minerals, liquid or gaseous, and growing plants.
In the definition, the terms fixed and immovable refer to the
substance of the thing, as soil, mineral, trees; the term perma
nent describes the property or interest in the thing, which is
perpetual. Anything lacking either of these elements is not
strictly speaking land.
Realty. The subject is fixed and immovable; the property is
perpetual.
Personalty. The subject is movable, the property is perish
able.
Chattel, Re^vl. The subject is fixed and immovable; the
property is perishable, e. g., a term under a lease of and for
years.
2. Tenement. This term was at one time broader than the
term land, and included the latter and anything of a permanent,
fixed and immovable nature which could be holden. It is now
ordinarily applied to structures on land.
3. Fixtures. This term is broader than tenement, it covers
the same things and certain others of a similar nature. There
are two sorts of fixtures, viz: true fixtures, and trade fixtures.
(a). Ti'ue fixtures are such structures on the land as in law
become a part thereof, (b). Trade fixtures are removable from
the land at the option of the temporary tenant.
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The rule for determining whether or not a structure or other
erection on land is one or the other kind of fixture is the intention
of the parties, the owner and the tenant.
To ascertain the intention, we look first to the terms of the
contract, called a lease. If it provide that buildings, structures,
machinery, placed on the land shall not become a part of the
realty, then no matter how substantial the structure or other
thing may be, it remains personalty. If land be leased for the
purpose of operating a business thereon requiring substantial
buildings and machinery, such things will ordinarily be regarded
as personalty and are called trade fixtures. The intention of the
parties is here interpreted according to the nature of the busi
ness to be conducted on the land.
If there be no express lease, or if the lease be silent on the
subject of fiixtures, then we look to the thing itself and to the
manner of its attachment to the soil. If it is a permanent struct
ure and substantially affixed, it is considered to be the intention
of the parties that such structure shall become a part of the land.
If one build such a structure on another's land by mistake
thinking that he was on his own land, the rule applies and the
structure is a part of the land.
To illustrate, where one rents a house and puts in grates, they
are true fixtures and part of the land. "Where land is leased
to an electric power corporation all structures necessary for the
conduct of its business are trade fixtures and removable by the
lessee. These include machinery, buildings, dams
4. Appurtenances. Additional to fixtures, which are part of
the land, there are certain rights, which attach to land and which
attain to something of the dignity of land. These are appur
tenances. They are incorporeal, incapable of perception by the
senses, but are permanent, and sometimes neeessai-y to the com
plete enjoyment of the land, hence it is proper to notice them
at this point.
(a). Basements. The most usual appurtenance to land is an
easement, which is a right one land owner has in the lands of
another. The subject may be best treated by taking a concrete
example, a right of'way. This is a right which one has to pass
over the lands of another. It arises in one of three ways-
agreement, prescription, law. '
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1st. By Agreement, This is an individual right, not traus-
ferrable, and must be exercised in accordance with the agree
ment. It is revocable, unless founded on value, or unless ex
ecuted and the grantee has expended money on account thereof.
2nd. By Prescription. Where one has exercised a right of
passing over another's land for the period of time specified in
the statutes, without objection on the part of the owner, consent
is presumed and the easement is complete.
3rd. By Law. Where one alienes land to another, so situate
that ingress and egress is possible only over the lands of tlie
alienor, the law confers the right of way on the alienee. The
right must be exercised with due regard to the rights of the
alienor. Should he fail to indicate the way, the alienee may
locate it.
The first of these easements is not necessarily appurtenant to
land, the last two are, always appurtenances.
It is evident that the number of easements is great, and it
is impossible to do more than mention some of the most import
ant. These are: to pond water, to conduct drains, to swing wires,
to overhang with structures.
(b). Servitude. Where one estate is subject to an easement
of another estate it is really a servitude, the former being the
servient and the latter the dominant estate. In a more confined
sense, where there is a natural easement, the term servitude is
used. Thus, where adjoining lands lie so that one is above the
other. The lower lot is servient to the higher as to the natural
flow of water, E converso the upper lot is servient to the lower
as to washings, and deposits of soil. Any artificial change of
conditions will destroy the servitude,
5, Hereditaments. Since all kinds of properties are heritable
in this country, the term hereditament is of little practical use
among us.' Anciently it covered lands which passed by descent,
incorporeal properties which were heritable, and certain peculiar
chattels known as heirlooms, which from their nature descended
to the heir as a limb of the inheritance. As inheritances are
partible in this country, and both realty and personalty are
assets to pay debts of the decedent, and heir-looms do not exist
with us, hereditaments do not cover any clearly defined terri
tory.
66 PRINCIPIA OF LAW
Things Incorporeal. There were discussed by ancient writ
ers, a number of intangible subjects of property, called incorpo
real hereditaments. Today such of these as survive may be
classed as appurtenauees, or easements, with perhaps one strik
ing exception, to-wit: shai'es of stock in a trading corporation.
These are not cognisable by the sense, are capable of ownei-ship,
may be disposed by sale, gift, or will, and are subject to debt.
In fact are recognized by law as properties, in which one may
have complete property.
Old writers, in dealing with realty, have viewed the subject
from the points of, tenure, estate, title. As this order is familiar,
and because we may the more easily comprehend the present
state of our law by a comparative study, we shall pursue the
subject on the old lines.
I mi iliiH 'liii I I
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CHAPTER XV.
TENURE.
Tenure is the manner in which the tenant hold lands, teu-
nients and hereditaments. The definition clearly shows that the
tenant is not the owner, but a mere holder of the land. It is
derived from the feudal notion, that all land was owned by the
sovereign, the lord paramount, and that all others held mediate
ly or immediately of him, upon the making of renders, i.e. per
forming service as vassals. The ultimate property or ownership
of land is called allodium. Such ownership is incorrectly called
allodial tenure, because the land is not held of anyone. Under
the Roman Empire the lands of Europe were owned allodially
by their proprietors. After the fall of the Empire, the Northern
Nations introduced feudal tenure. It was introduced into Eng
land by the Norman Conquerors. The English Colonies in this
country followed this system to a limited extent. The royal
colonial grants were feudal, the grant to the G-eorgia Company
being to hold of us and our heirs, in free and common socage,
as of our Honor of Hampton Court, and not in capite.
By the Act of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, re-
enacted in Stat. 12, Car. II. feudal burdens were abolished,
and the lands of England, for all practical purposes, became
allodial.
Upon the organization of our State Governments, the pro
prietorship of land was declared to be allodial. "By one of
those singular revolutions incident to human affairs, allodial
estates, once universal in Europe and then almost universally
exchanged for feudal tenure, have now after the lapse of many
centuries regained their primitive estimation in the minds of
freemen."
In America the sovereign is the source, not the owner. It
may be instructive to recall the facts, so as to show the relation
of the State to the land, after it has passed into individual pro
prietorship. .^t the time of the independence of the thirteen
original States, all lands therein, which were in private hands,
became allodial. The States having succeeded to the sovereignty
of the British Crown became thenceforward the source of title.
That land not in individual proprietorship became eo instanti
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the property of the State. When subsequently acquired by indi
viduals or corporations, it was by direct grant from the State.
Lands within the boundaries of the United States and not with
in the limits of a State vested in the United States, either by
succession to British Sovereignty or by discovery, exploration
or conquest. Such of those lands as were in individual pro
prietorship were regarded in law as derived from the United
States. Other lands in these Territories were granted by the
United States direct to individuals or corporations or were re
tained as public domain. Upon the organization of a State out
of such Territory, the State succeeded to the rights and position
of the United States. Thus all lands in the new States are de
rived from the State. In that territory acquired by the United
States by cession, as for instance, from Virginia, Georgia,
France, Spain, Mexico, lands in individual proprietorship were
protected by the Acts and Treaties of cession. The estates be
came allodial, if not such before. The subsequent erection of any
such territory into a State conferred on the State all the rights
of the United States. The Republic of Texas acquired her
rights by war and her lands were in law derived from her as
their source. Annexation to the United States made no change.
Thus all titles have their source in the State or the United
States.
Eminent Domain. The Government exercises the right to con
demn land for public purposes, upon making just compensation
to the owner.
Escheat. Lands for which there is no taker, from failure of
heirs or otherwise, pass to the State or to the United States as
ultimate heir.
It is erroneous to consider these as relics of feudal tenure
They are powers and rights inherent in the sovereign over the
soil of the sovereignty, necessary for self preservation and to
prevent disputes.
As all landed proprietorship is allodial, we may say then
that there is no tenure of land in this country, in the sense of
holding of a superior and mediately or immediately of the owner.
The individual proprietor is the owner.
Seisin. The term .seisin has a definite meaning in the feudal
law. The person sei.sed is he on whom the overlord conferred the
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manual investitute of the fee in the land. All who derive from
liim are successively seised. As we have no feudal tenure and,
of course, no investitute, the term has a different meaning with
us. As eminent authorities have declined to define the term
in American law we shall not attempt it. Suffice it to say that
one who owns a life estate or a greater estate in land, is said to
he seised. It is not synonymous with possession, for one may
have posession of land of which another is seised. It may be
described as a freehold estate, in land, accompanied with actual
possession, or the right of po.ssession, or the right to the future
possession.
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CHAPTER XVI.
ESTATES.
Estate is the quantity and quality of interest one has in
land. Thus, the owner has the entire interest. If his interest
is defeasible it is conditional. If more than one is interested
in the same land at the same time, their estate is in common.
Again one may have an interest of a term of ten years, another
a life interest expectant on the term, and a third may have the
fee interest in remainder. Here all three interests, the term,
the life estate, and the remainder subsist at the same time, and
all three together constitute the fee.
1 Quaittity of Interest. Quantity of interest, when spoken
of an estate, means the length of time of the enjoyment of the
owner. Prom this viewpoint, estates are grouped as, freehold
and less than freehold. Freehold estates are further subdivided
into, freeholds of inheritance and freeholds not of inheritance.
2. Qualjty of Interest. In this sense estates may be, upon
condition, in expectancy, or in common.
We will take up estates in the order thus indicated.
FEEEHOliD estates.
Blackstone describes a freehold to be an estate which passes
by livery of seisin in things corporeal, and by acts equivalent
thereto, in things incorporeal. We have no livery. The test of
seisin is that it applies only to freeholds. Hence we complete a
circle, and the definitions are worthless, A freehold is an
estate in land greater than a term of years and includes a life
estate and a fee.
A term of years or a less interest in land (if the latter amount
to an estate at all) is an Estate less than a Freehold.
freehold estates of inheritance.
A freehold estate of inheritance is one which vests in the heir
at the death of the owner.
1. Fee Simple. The great type of this estate is the fee or
fee simple. This is a freehold of inheritance, unlimited and un
conditioned. The fee is the entire estate and in contemplation of
law continues forever and without break. This is the highest
estate known to the law. The interest of the fee owner is prop,
erty in its complete sense. The only limitation of ownership ig
the power of eminent domain resident in the State. The only
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clog upon his power is the prohibition to convey for the purpose
of defeating his creditors.
At common law it was necessary to use words of inheritance,
heirs or similar words, in order to create a fee. The failure
to do this had the effect of creating a life estate in the grantee.
This rule no longer prevails in this country If the language of
the conveyance shows an intention of the grantor to create a
fee in the grantee, such will be the effect, even though words of
inheritance be not used. This was the construction put upon
conveyances by devise at common law, and the same rules now
apply to conveyances inter vivos.
2. Base Fee. There is today no practical difference between
a base fee and a fee estate upon condition. Conditional estates
wiU be noticed under the quality of estates. The base fee is
mentioned here only to enable us to understand the fee tail.
3. Fee Tail. An estate fee limited to the heirs of the body
of the grantee was called a fee tail. It was a conditional fee, but
by force of the statute de donis it was not freed from the condi
tion by the birth of issue. Herein it differed from the ordinary
conditional fee. It was forever fixed in a certain line of descent.
On failure of heirs in that line the estate reverted to the grantor
or his heirs Entails are forbidden by our statutes. A deed
purporting to create an entailed estate is construed to convey
the fee to the grantee. Limitations, which by construction would
create by implication an estate tail, give a life estate to the
grantee with remainder in fee to children and descendants, if no
issue remainder to beneficiaries intended by the maker of the
instrument.
4. Incidents op Fee Estates. As has already been intimated
the person in whom the fee vests is the absolute owner of the
land. He has the right to possess it and may by action at law
acquire the possession from an adverse holder. He can dispose
of the estate by voluntary conveyance, or for a consideration.
He can devise it by will to whomsoever his fancy or caprice
may dictate. At his death intestate the estate passes by descent
to those whom the law designates as his heirs at law. He may
use and abuse the land at will, so long as he does not work a
nuisance to others. It is subject to the claims of his creditors
under the proper legal proceeding for that purpose.
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CHAPTER XVII.
FREEHOLD ESTATES NOT OF INHERITANCE,
This paraphrase is another name for life estates A life
estate is one which endures in the present owner only during the
life of the person on whose life it is limited. The owner of the
estate is called the life tenant, the one on whose life the estate
is limited is called cestuy que vie. Upon the death of the cestuy
que vie the estate ceases in the life tenant, hence it is not an
estate of inheritance. Life estates, from the manner in which
they arise, are grouped as conventional and legal, the former is
created by the act of the parties, the latter by the act of the law.
1. Conventional Life Estates. "Where from a deed or devise
appears the intention of the maker to create a life estate in the
grantee or devisee, this intention will be effectuated. Conven
tional life estates are of three kinds:
(a) For the life of the grantee. This is the simplest form and
where the conveyance is so expressed there is no question.
"Where the conveyance is for life, without stating for whose life
it is construed to create a life estate in the grantee. The rule of
construction is that the deed shall be taken most strongly in
favor of the grantee and against the grantor. An estate for the
life of the tenant being the most desirable kind, this estate is
created by such a conveyance.
(b) For the life of another. This is called an estate pur auter
vie. It is created by a conveyance of an estate to one for and
during the life of another. The estate ceases in the life tenant
at the death of the cestuy que vie.
(c) For the lives of several. A conveyance of an estate to
several for and during life creates this estate. All the grantees
muist be in life at the time the estate is created, so that really
this Is an estate to endure until the death of he survivor.
2. Legal Life Estates. These estates are created by opera
tion of law. They are dower and curtesy. The latter is uni
versal, the former has disappeared in most of the States.
(a) Dower This is a life estate of a married woman in one-
thiird of all realty, of which the husband was beneficially seised
in law or in fact during overture, which her issue might in
herit, vesting at the time of marriage, but postponed in enjoy
ment to the contingency of her surviving the husband.
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First. Essentials of Dower, In order to create this estate
three things must occur: First, a valid marriage must have
been contracted, and must not have been annulled by divorce.
Second, the husband must have been seised. By this we under
stand that he must have been the owner and in the enjoyment of
an estate freehold, and in this case of a freehold of inheritance.
Third, the death of the husband must occur to vest the estate in
possession in his widow.
Second, Commencement of the Estate, In some States the
definition of dower above given is the law. The wife's life
estate begins at the time of the marriage in any lands then in
seisin of the husband; and in lands acquired during the cover
ture, at the moment of acquisition. In both cases the dower is
postponed in enjoyment until the deatli of the husband. In
these States, in order to convey realty, the wife must join the
husband in the deed, or must execute a separate instrument re
linquishing the dower In some States the dower attaches only
to lands of which the husband was seised beneficially at the time
of his death. Provision is made to protect the vendor for un
paid purchase money, the mortgagee ^-ho has loaned money on
the security of the land. In these States the dower commences
at the death of the husband, and the widow has the right to have
it admeasured or set apart.
Third, Assignment of Dower. The methods of setting apart
dower differ in the several States. The rules are usually found
in the statutes regulating the administration of decedents' es
tates. The amount is one-third of the land. The capital man
sion house in the country is included without being valued.
Fourth, Dower Barred, The dower estate may be destroyed
in one of several ways.
(1) By deed, "Where the wife voluntarily relinquishes her
dower by a properly executed conveyance, the estate is defeated
in those States where it attaches to all lands in seisin during
coverture,
(2) By ante-nuptial settlement whereby the wife accepts a
provision in lieu of dower,
(3) Where the statutes recognize the widow as an heir at
law, she may choose to inherit and thus relinquish the dower.
Or in case the husband devise land to the wife in lieu of dower.
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slie may choose between the devise and the dower. (Note—In
some States she may make an equitable election, in others she
cannot.)
(4) By failure to apply for the assignment of dower, within
the time prescribed in the statutes.
(5) By adultery of the wife, unpardoned by the husband, the
dower is barred.
(b.) Curtesy. This was a life estate in a widower in the
lands of his deceased wfe, which postponed her heirs in enjoy
ment until his death. As in most, if not all, of the States the
rules of inheritance recognize the widower as an heir df the
deceased wife, the reason for this estate has ceased and the
estate has disappeared. Cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex.
3. Incidents op Life Estates. The tenant for life is entitled
to the full use and enjoyment, so that he exercise the ordinary
care of a prudent man in preservation and protection, and com
mit no act causing permanent damage to the next taker. Thus
he may continue to use the land as it had previously been used.
He may continue a mine in operation. He cannot open a new
mine, if the effect would be permanently to impair the value of
the freehold. He may use wood or other things on the land.
He may sell wood or timber from the land, provided he does
not so denude it, as to destroy or seriously diminish its value.
He may alter or remove buildings or other structures, with the
like restrictions, always having in view the reasonable enjoy
ment. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
(a) Waste. Acts which exceed the reasonable use of the land
are termed waste. In some States the life tenant forfeits the
estate for waste committed. In other jurisdictions, he may be
restrained by injunction, and made to compensate in damages
the person next entitled. The subject of waste will be noticed
under the head of torts.
(b) Emblements. Crops planted on the land and not matured
at the time of the death of the life tenant are called emblements.
His representative has the right to enter on the land for the pur
pose of completing the cultivation and to harvest. Emblements
can be claimed only in annual crops, not the fruit of trees grow
ing on the land, but such things as are the fruit of the planting
by the tenant. Should the life tenant forfeit the estate, by
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coramitting waste or otherwise, he loses his right to emblements.
"No man can take advantage of his own wrong." Should the
life tenant lease or rent the land*to another, the sub-tenant's
right to emblements will not be lost, by the death of the life
tenant, by forfeiture of life tenant by condemnation for public
purposes. These are all beyond his control and should work him
no damage. The act of God injures no man. The act of the
law injures no man.
PERPETUITIES.
Before leaving the subject of the quantity, i. e., the duration
of an interest in lands, it is proper to say a word as to per
petuities. The tying up of estates, so that the land ceases to
subserve many of the purposes of untrammeled holdings, is
against the policy of our law. Estates tail are abolished and
forbidden One is pei*mitted to control the devolution of his
land for a period of time only. The statutes as a general thing
permit one to limit an estate to a life or lives in esse and three
lifetimes thereafter. Thus a man may by will devise his land to
his son for life, and to his grandson, then living, and limit the
grandson's power of alienation until he reaches the age of
twenty-one years. The expression three lifetimes means twenty-
one years and the usual period of gestation thereafter. Seven
years is a lifetime. The usual period of gestation is considered
to be nine montlis (two hundred and eighty days), and thirty
days, reckoned from conception to birth. "Where an attempt is
made to create a perpetuity, these limitations apply and the fee
vests accordingly.
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CHAPTER XVIII.
ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.
An estate in lands for any fixed or certain period; or any
estate at will; or any estate at sufferance is less than a freehold.
ESTATE FOR YEARS.
Estate for Years is the type of this species of estate and is
one limited in duration to a certain period of time. Thus an
estate to A and his heirs for ninety-nine yeans, or for six cal
endar months, either is an estate for yeai's. An estate to A until
B shall marry or reach the age of twenty-one years is also an
estate for years, because the duration of the estate is ascertain-
able from the terms of the instrument. Id certum est quod
certum reddi potest. The freehold in this estate remains in the
grantor and his heirs. The tenant for years has an estate in the
land called, at common law, a term, which is regarded as a
chattel interest. He is possessed of the term and in order to
have a complete property must be in possession of the land. In
the case above given the word heira of the termor indicate the
successors in the term, and are words not of inheritance but of
purchase. The act of corporal investiture, livery of seisin,
whereby alone, in feudal times, the freehold could pass and vest,
does not prevail with us. Hence, where the common law says
the grantor and his heirs are seised in fee, and the tenant or
termor is possessed of his term, we may express the idea by
saying that the grantor and his heirs are the ultimate owners
of the fee estate, and the tenant owns a term of years carved
thereout.
Landlord and Tenant. A clear distinction exists between an
estate for years and the relation of landlord and tenant. The
latter arises from a contract. The owner of land grants another
the right to possess and enjoy the use of it, for a certain time or
at will; the other accepts the grant. No estate passes, the tenant
has the mere usufruct, which he cannot convey, and which is not
subject to his debts. Some States fix a period, as five yeans,
within which such grants convey no estate.
iNcroENTS OP Estates for Years. Tenant for years has the
right to the use and enjoyment as fully as the true owner would
have if in possession. Acts and omissions which would work a
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forfeiture of a life estate will have that effect upou a term of
years.
Emblements. The doctrine of emblements finds no place in
estates for years, except the estate be prematurely terminated by
the happening of an event beyond the control of the tenant and
injurious to him. Thus, if A be tenant of a farm for ten years,
beginning on the first day of August, and he sow in the spring,
he cannot claim emblements, because he knew that his tenancy
must terminate before harvest. If, however, the tenancy com
mence at New Year and the grantor be a Kfe-tenant, and the
grantor die after the crop is sown and before harvest, the
termor is entitled to emblements.
ESTATES AT WILL, OB ON SUFFEB^VNCE.
"Where one is in possession of the land of another under an
agreement either express or implied that the ow*ner may resume
possession at any time, such possession is not regarded as an
estate at all. The rights and liabilities of the parties will be
determined by the terms of the contract.
A fortiori, where one is in possession by the mere sufferance of
the owner, such possessor has no estate recognizable in law.
In such cases the circumstances, in the absence of express agree
ment, must be looked to, in order to ascertain the rights of the
parties. In case of tenancy at will, the statutes usually provide
that the owner must give notice to the tenant of the termination
of the relation, and sometimes provision is made that the tenant
shall notify the owner of his intention to quit the tenancy, and
the tenant, in the absence ofsuch notice, is liable for rent. Sum
mary means for regaining possession are afforded the owner.
In the absence of express agreement, the paying and receiv
ing of rent, as welt as the times at which it was paid and other
facts will serve to guide the court. Where rent is paid a certain
sum each month, the tendency of the law is to presume that the
tenancy is for twelve months. This presumption is easily re
movable by evidence.
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CHAPTER XIX.
QUALITY OP ESTATES.
Having said thus'much upon the quantity of estates, we now
come to treat estates from the viewpoint of their quality, whereby
we mean the qualifications of the interests of the owners. In
this sense, the estate may be unconditional, clogged with limita
tions, in present enjoyment, postponed in enjoyment; or the
interest may be sole, or in connection with others. First we take
up Estates upon Condition.
ESTATES ON CONDITION.
A condition is an uncertain event upon the happening or not
happening of which an estate is created, enlarged or defeated.
1. Condition Implied. This is a condition inseparably an
nexed from the very nature of the estate, so that a breach of it
works a forfeiture. For example, it is condition inseparable
from a life estate, that the life-tenant shall not so use the land
as to work injury to the one in expectancy. Should he commit
waste, he thereby forfeits his estate by breach of the condition
upon which he holds.
In this sense then all estates, except the fee simple, are estates
upon condition implied. For it is a general rule that any deal
ing with the estate in a manner repugnant to the nature thereof
will work a forfeiture of it. This iiile has in modern laws many
qualifications. For instance, if a life-tenant, at common law,
attempted to aliene in fee, he forfeited his estate and the alienee
acquired nothing. Now the alienee acquires an estate for the
life of the alienor.
Blackstone pushes the doctrine of implied conditions even to
fee simple estates, for says he, it is granted on the implied con
dition that the tenant will not commit a crime involving for
feiture. Forfeiture for crime having been abolished in this
country, and condemnation by the State under the power of
eminent domain being the only way of depriving an owner of a
fee simple estate, it seems a useless refinement to say that a fee
simple estate is clogged with any condition whatever, and serv
ing no good purpose is likely to breed confusion.
2. Condition Express. An express condition is set forth in
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the instrument creating the estate. Express conditions are
precedent and subsequent.
(a) Condition Precedent. A precedent condition is one which
mnst be fulfilled before the estate can commence or be enlarged.
Thus, the conveyance of an estate to A upon his marriage with
B, clearly contains a condition, i. e., an uncertain event. It is
express, being set out in the instrument, it is precedent because
A will never acquire the estate unless and until he intermarry
with B.
(b) Condition Subsequent. A condition subsequent is one
whereby an estate already vested may be defeated. Thus, an
estate "is devised to A during her widowhood, (durante vid-
uitate); should she marry she forfeits the estate. As she may
not maiW, s^e may enjoy the estate during her life, this is a life
estate on condition subsequent. It is a life estate, because under
the rule of construction the highest estate possible under the
language of the instrument is held to be intended, it is clogged
with the condition that the widow shall not marry.
As has been already suggested, fee estates may be clogged
with express condition either precedent or subsequent. An illus
tration of the former has been given under condition precedent.
As illustrating the latter, s-uppose an estate in the manor of
Dale be granted to Aand his heirs forever, tenants of the manor
of Bolingbroke This is a fee, for it may endure forever; it has
a condition subsequent which may defeat it. For should A or
his heir cease to own Bolingbroke, eo instanti he loses Dale.
(e) Limitation. A distinction is made at common law be
tween a condition subsequent and a limitation. The former is
called a condition in deed, the latter a condition m law. In a
condition subsequent it was necessary that the grantor or his
heir claim the forfeiture of the estate, and m case he did not,
then the estate would remain in the hands of the tenant, even
after condition broken. In the example just given, should A
or his heir lose the manor of Bolingbroke, it was necessary that
the grantor or his heir should claim the forfeiture and make
entry or bring action, otherwise the ownership of the manor of
Dale would continue in Aand his heirs. _This is a condition sub-
seauent But had the conveyance contained a limitation over to
third parties, on the happening of the condition, the estate ceases
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3n A and liis heira and at once vests in tlie third party ox' has
heir, by an act of law without the intervention of any party.
The third party must maintain the action in his own name. In
the above example had the conveyance been to A and his heirs
owners of the manor of Bolingbroke, and failing that then to C
and his heirs, now as soon as A or his heir loses the manor of
Bolingbroke, the rights of C or his heir arise, and he can pro
ceed to claim the manor of Dale. This is a limitation. From the
foregoing, it would seem then, that a limitation is an express
s.atement by the grantor of the period of the grantee's en
joyment.
As the object of the distinction was to protect third parties,
in case the grantor through collusion or neglect failed to claim
the forfeiture, and as the right of the third party, to bring action
and claim remedies in his own name, is now fully recognized,
the distinction is no longer important.
(d) Covenant. In construing conveyances, it is important to
distinguish a condition subsequent and a covenant. .On breach
of the former, the estate is forfeited j on breach of the latter (a
collateral promise) an action for damages will lie. Thus, should
a deed recite, that the land conveyed shall revert to the grantor
or his heir, in the event it should ever be used for any but church
purposes, this would be a condition subsequent and on breach the
land would revert. But should the deed stipulate that the land
should be used for church purposes only, without more, this
would be a covenant only, and for breach thereof, the grantor
or his heir may claim damages against the guilty party.
(e) Vom Conditions. Certain conditions are not recognized
in law and are called void conditions. An estate already vested
will not be divested on failure to perform such condition. These
are illegal, immoral, impossible and repugnant to the nature of
the estate. Thus if one be invested with an estate which will be
void unless within a twelvemonth he commit a crime, here the
estate is stripped of the condition, because it is illegal.
Clearly the doctrine of void conditions applies only to condi
tions subsequent. A man may impose an impossible condition
precedent, which would simply mean that he did not intend to
convey anything. A grant of an estate to one upon condition
that he go to China and return in one day conveys nothing. A
PRINCIPIA OF LAW ^ 81
limitation is sometimes effective where a condition subsequent
would not attach.
(f) Performance op Conditions. Care should be taken to
distinguish the opposite effects of the happening of the uncer
tain event. "We may best illustrate with the two qualified fees
of the English law. A base fee contains a condition subsequent,
upon the happening of which the estate is defeated. An ex
ample has been above given of a conveyance of the manor of
Dale to one and his heirs tenants of the manor of Bolingbroke.
"When the grantee or his heir loses Bolingbroke, he instantly
loses Dale. A fee conditional contains a condition subsequent,
which being performed, the estate is freed therefrom. As where
an estate is conveyed to one and the heirs of his body. When a
child is born to the grantee, the condition is performed and the
estate is stripped of it, the grantee has a fee simple. Ajs the
grantee then had the right to alien the estate, the statute de
donis was enacted for the purpose of perpetuating this estate
in the line of descent, and this is an exception to the general
rule of conditions. As we have seen, the effect was to create a
statutory estate peculiar to the English law called an estate tail.
3. Estates in Vadio, Gage, Pledge. There is an important
group of estates on condition subsequent, which estates were
created for a temporary purpose, usually until a sum of mone}'
was paid. The conveyance created an estate defeasible on con
dition subsequent.
(a) VivuM Vadium. The living pledge existed where one
owed money to another, and conveyed land to the creditor, c.n
condition that the estate thus created should be defeated, when
ever the rents, issues and profits of the land should pay the debt.
This transaction required that the creditor should go into pos
session. It became obsolete and gave way to the mortgage.
(b) Mortuum Vadium. The mortgage or dead pledge was a
defeasible conveyance on condition subsequent, whereby the
debtor creates an estate in the creditor, which estate will be
defeated if the debtor pay to the creditor the sum specified in
the conveyance on a certain day. The mortgagor retains pos
session of the laud. Should the mortgagor pay the money when
due, the estate ceases in the mortgagee and is again complete in
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the mortgagor. If the monej' is not paid, the estate becomes
absolute in the mortgagee and he can enter.
(c) Equity of Redemption. As the mortgaged premises are
always more valuable than the sura due, it seemed a hardship on
the mortgagor thus to lose his land. At law he had no remedy
as the estate had vested in the mortgagee. The mortgagor ap
plied to the Equity Court, and was allowed a later day on which
to redeem. This indulgence was called the Equity of Redemp
tion. It was allowed on the idea that the deed was intended to
secure a debt and not to convey the land. It earae in time to
be recognized, without resort to court and ripened into an equit
able estate. Thus a hardship was wrought upon the mortgagee,
who could not get his money or the land. Hence at his in
stance, the Equity Court interfered in his favor and fixed a day
on which the mortgagor must pay principal, interest and ex
penses and redeem the land, failing which, his equity of re
demption was forever foreclosed, and the mortgagee had an
absolute estate in the land.
Thus we see that at law, the mortgage is a conveyance of an
estate upon condition subsequent; in equity, it is a security for
the payment of a debt. In modern law the latter view prevails.
In some States the mortgage is merely a security, and creates no
'estate whatever. In other States, the mortgage with power of
sale does convey title and is also a security for debt.
The subject of mortgages, and the methods of enforcing the
payment of the debts by them secured, will be noticed in our
treatment of Equitable titles.
(d) Deed to Secure Debt. In some States where the equit
able idea prevails, to-wit: that a mortgage is a mere security for
a debt, there has been a recurrence by statute to the ancient
mortgage. The statute recognizes a conveyance of the estate,
absolute in form, but for the purpose of securing a loan, and
provides a remedy for the lender peculiar to that transaction.
It practically creates a fee estate on condition subsequent.
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CHAPTER XX.
ESTATES IN EXPECTANCY.
Estate in expectancy is a present interest in land, postponed
in enjoyment. Tliey are remainders and reversions. It was
formerly the rule that the former were ereater by the act of
parties, the latter by the act of law. The modern distinction be
tween them seems to be: where the grantor owns the expectancy
it is a revei-sion; where the expectancy is owned by some other
party, it is a remainder. Thus, ifAconvey land to Bfor life, at
B's death the life estate determines and the estate vests com
pletely in Aor his heir. This is a reversion. If Aconvey land
to B for life and remainder to C and his heirs in fee, here C is
the remainderman, and at the death of the life tenant has the
full enjoyment of the estate. In all eases both the present and
the expectant estates subsist together and both together consti
tute the complete estate, i. e., the fee. Take the case of the
dowager and the heir. The dower (life estate) and the re
mainder in fee subsist at the death of the ancestor. The widow
is the life tenant and the heir is the remainderman in fee. If
the heir aliene his interest the alienee acquires the fee expect
ant on the dower. If the iridow aliene her interest, the alienee
acquires an estate pur auter vie.
ESTATES IN REMAINDEK.
In order to understand remainder estates it is best to notice
some of the essentials of English remainders and note the
changes introduced in modern laws. Most of the peculiar tie
„ thpir .source in the requirement oi
of English remainders have tiieir .suuit. , , , ^ .
livery of seisin, i. e., actual delivery of the land to pass a free
hold estate. This being a physical act could on y performed
in present!, therefore it was impossible to create a freehold to
commence in future. We have no livery of
and many methods of dealing with estates aie possible with us,
which were not allowable in Bnglan
ENGLISH remainders.
i.- .loT- nrpcedent estate, less than the1. There must be a partieu ar preeed
fee, to support the reinamdei, • g This estate
A for life with remainder in fee to -ts anu
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is perfected by making livery of seisin to A. The effect is two
fold: it divests the grantor's interest and invests the life tenant
with the life estate and the remainderman with the remainder in
fee. To pass the freehold livery must be made, if made to A
without more it would simply vest the entire estate in him and
there would be no remainder. If made to B it would in like
manner vest the "whole estate in him and there would be no re
mainder. As it was impossible to make future livery the free
hold could not commence in the future, and a precedent estate
was necessary to create a remainder. The destruction of the
particular estate destroyed the remainder, because it created an
hiatus or chasm, which is repugnant to the nature of an estate.
So if the particular estate be destroyed, the land reverts to the
grantor or his heir, and the remainder does not take effect.
2. The entire estate, to-wit: the particular estate and the
remainders expectant thereon, must pass out of the grantor at'
one and the same time; e. g., an estate granted to A for life,
with remainder to B and his heire in fee. Here the life estate
and the remainder, both together constituting the entire estate or
fee, pass out of the grantor by one and the (same act. In case of a
vested remainder, the two interests, the life estate and the re
mainder, vest at the same time and subsist together, the one in
possession and the other in expectancy.
3. The remainder must vest in the remainderman during the
continuance of the particular estate or at the moment of termi
nation. Should the remainder vest at the commencement of the
particular estate, it is a vested remainder. In case it does not so
vest, it is a contingent remainder pending the vesting.
(a) Vested Remainder. A vested remainder, whereby a
present interest is created to be enjoyed in the future, is in
variably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the par
ticular estate is spent; e. g., in the example in the last paragraph,
B's remainder vests in him at the time that A's life estate vests
in him. At A's death B's right of possession at once arises.
Should B die before A, instantly the remainder descends to
B's heir.
(b) Contingent Remainder. Contingent remainder is lim
ited to take effect and be enjoyed, upon a dubious or uncertain
person or a dubious or uncertain event, so that the particular
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estate maj' determine and the remainder never take effect; e. g.,
where A is tenant for life, with remainder to B's eldest son
unborn. Here the remainder does not vest at the creation of the
particular estate, but is contingent upon the birth of B's son, an
uncertain person. Should the life tenant die before the birth of
a son to B, the remainder is destroyed, and a son born after
ward cannot take under the conveyance. Immediately upon the
birth of a son to B during the life tenancy, the remainder vests
in him, and is no longer contingent. Should such son die im
mediately after birth, the remainder descends to his heir. Again
should an estate be convej^ed to A and B for life, with remainder
to the survivor in fee, manifestly the remainder is contingent
upon an uncertain event,, i. e., the death of one of the life ten
ants, and cannot vest until that event. Immediately upon the
death of one of the life tenants, the estate vests in the survivor.
This is an instance of a remainder being contingent up to the
moment of the termination of the particular estate.
MODERN REMAINDERS.
Modern remainders are more properly estates in expectancy
than true remainders. In order to understand them, it is well
to follow the history of English estates. Upon the adoption of
the Statute of "Wills, in the reign of Henry VIII, the conveyance
of estates by devise was recognized. As the devise does not take
effect until the death of the deviso.r, livery of seisin is of course
impossible, many of the requisites of remainders by deed ceased
to apply to remaindei*s by devise. These estates were anciently
called executory devises to distinguish them from proper re
mainders.
In executory devises:
1. There was no necessity for a particular estate, in other
words the freehold might be made to commence in future; e. g.,
an estate devised to a woman upon he rmarriage. Here,, at the
death of the devisor, the estate descends to the heir, who holds
it until the contingency happens.
2. A fee or a less estate than a fee may be limited after a fee;
e. g., one devises land in fee to A but should A die before the
age of twenty-one, then to B and his heirs. This is a limitation
as heretofore explained. It is good in a devise, but under a deed
86 PRINCIPIA OF LAW
would not be, for the whole estate having passed to A there was
no remainder upon which the instrument could operate in B's
favor. The rules as to perpetuities, as already explained, apply
here.
3. A term of years may be granted to one for his life, and
afterward limited over to another; e. g., one devises to A for his
life, a term of ninety-nine years, with remainder to B and his
heirs. Here at the death of the life tenant the residue of the
term vests in the remainderman. There may be as many suc
cessive remainders thus created as fancy may dictate, always
\vith the proviso however that all the remaindermen be in esse
during the life of the first devisee.
In modem law, the same relaxation of the mles, which was
made in England in favor of devises, is extended to conveyances
inter vivos. Hence a modern remainder is not only an estate
limited to take effect after another estate is determined, but is
also any estate to be enjoyed at a specified time in the future,
by some one other than the grantor or his heir.
ESTATES IN REVERSION.
A reversion, says Blackstone, is the residue of an estate left in
the grantor and his heirs to take effect in enjoyment after the
determination of an estate in the land which he has already
granted. In this sense, when the fee has been conveyed the
reversion is said to remain in the grantor and his heirs, and that
the reversion could never take effect unless the estate was ex
tinguished in the grantee and his heirs, by failure of heirs.
Hence it was said this estate became effective by the act of God.
In modern law when the fee is conveyed, no interest whatever
remains in the grantor. Reversion with us means the return of
the land to the grantor or his heir when a less estate, like a life
estate, has been spent; e. g., A convieys to B an estate for life
without limitation over. At the expiration of the life estate the
fee which remained in the grantor, enures in possession in him
or his heir. As the grantor takes under the instrument, it is
scarcely correct to say that this estate arises by operation of law.
Merger. When a greater and a less estate coincide and meet
in the same individual, in his individual capacity, the less
estate is destroyed, i. e., merges or drowns in the greater estate.
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Thus, if the life tenant acquire the revei-sion, the life estate
merges in the fee. The rule does not apply where the estates
come to one by virtue of different rights; e. g., where one estate
comes to him individually and the other comes to him as exec
utor or admiuistrator.
: . i
1
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CHAPTER SXI.
NUilBEB OF OWNERS—TRUST ESTATES.
In all cases where more than one individual own land, with
the right to simultaneous possession and enjoyment, there is a
common right, and they are called tenants in common. The
interests need not be equal, nor derived from the same source,
nor acquired at the same time. Thus it is evident that the Eng
lish estates in joint-tenancy and in coparcenary have been re
duced into tenancies in common. The peculiar features of those
estates do not attach to estates in common. The only test of
tenancy in common is unity of possession.
INCIDENTS.
Each of the owners in common has the right to pofeess the
land, and enjoy it, provided he occupy no greater portion than
his share would be on division. One of the owners in possession
and enjoyment of the whole estate is liable to account to his
co-tenant for rents or for waste ratably. By pursuing the statu
tory methods common ownership may at the option of any owner
be reduced into severalty.
TRUST ESTATES.
Trust estates are the creatures of equity, and although at the
present day, they differ from legal estates less than fonnerly, yet
a clearer conception of modern trust estates can be obtained from
a consideration of their origin and history, than by attempting to
state their present condition here, we postpone trust estates to
the subject of equity.
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CHAPTER XXII.
TITLE.
Title is the means whereby one's right in land is established.
The interest or estate in land comes to the owner and he is
assured in the enjoyment by his title. There are two recognized
sources of title, to-wit: descent and purchase. Where upon the
death of an ancestor, one acquires an estate in land, as the heir
at law, his title is by descent. This is an act of law. Where by
act of the parties title is transferred from one to another, that
other acquires title by purchase. It must be remembered that the
same act divests and invests the title.
DESCENT.
Descent or inheritance, the acquisition of an estate by the
heir upon the death of the ancestor, by operation of law, depends
upon the rules by law established for the devolution of deced
ents' estates. The principle underlying these rules is con
sanguinity. Consanguinity or community of blood is the rela
tionship of individuals descended from the same ancestor or
common stock.
The exceptions to the general application of this principle
grew out of Feudal tenure in England. The inheritance was not
partible, but descended to a single heir; it never lineally ascend
ed; males were preferred to females; the eldest male excluded
all others; the cognati were preferred to the agnati.
The reasons for these rules do not exist in this countrj'. The
statutes of distribution of the several States go upon the prin
ciple of cansanguinity and additional thereto they recognize
that husband and wife may inherit from each other. It is im
possible to give the laws of States upon this subject. The land
of a party deceased immediately upon his death passes to his
heirs at law, as ascertained by the laws of the State where the
land is situate.
RULES OF INHERITANCE.
The following rules of inheritance are typical of the laws of
the several States on this subject:
1. The husband is the sole heir of the wife as to her general
estate; her separate estate is inherited equally by her husband
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and her children per capita, and by the descendants of children
per stirpes.
2. The wife is the sole heir of the husband, in case there is
no living issue.
3. Should there be issue living, the widow and children in
herit share and share alike, descendants of deceased children
take per stirpes. It is sometimes provided that the widow shall
not receive less than a certain part, say one-fifth, even if the
shares exceed five in number,
4. Children stand in the first degree, and inherit equally from
the parent. The descendants of children deceased represent
them, and inherit per stirpes,
5. Brothers, sisters and father, (if no father, then mother)
stand in the second degree, and if there be no widow, or living
issue, inherit equally. The descendants of deceased brothers and
sisters represent them.
6. Uncles, aunts and first cousins stand in the next degree and
inherit equally. Paternal and maternal relations are on the
same footing.
7. More remote degrees are traced according to the English
canons of inheritance.
The expression per capita means share and share alike, an
equal distribution according to the number of distributees.
The expression per stirpes may best be explained by an illus
tration: A, the ancestor, had three children, B, C and D. At
the time of A's death, B was alive j C was dead leaving two liv
ing children; D was dead leaving surviving him one child and
two grandchildren, whose parent was dead. B receives one-
third of the ancestor's land. C's two children receive each one-
half of their parent's third. The child of D receives one-half of
his parent's third, and the two grandchildren receive each one-
half of their parent's half of the third of the ancestor's estate.
Under the laws of this country the land descends to the heirs
at the death of the ancestor. But all one's properties, real and
personal, are liable for his debts. (At common law the land was
not so liable.) Hence the land and personalty usually vest in
the administrator. After the payment of the debts, the residue
of the land is divided by the administrator according to the
statute. If there are no debts, and all the distributees are sui
juris, there is no necessity for administration.
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It is well to remember that, in the disposition of a decedent's
estate, the land descends according to the laws of the state where
it is situated, but the personalty is distributed according to the
laws of the State of the decedent 's residence.
PURCHASE.
Purchase is the acquisition of an estate in land in any other
way except by descent, and it is an act of the parties. In the
legal sense purchase is used synonymously with acquisition. The
old law used the words perquisitio, acquisitio and conquisitio
interchangeably. Therefore if one acquire an estate by con
veyance for value, by conveyance voluntary, by prescriptive
occupancy, by devise, he is a purchaser. As nothing was herit
able at common law except the fee, it has been already seen that
in the case of a conveyance of a term of ninety-nine years to one
and his heirs, the heir takes not by inheritance but by purchase.
RULE IN SHELLY'S CASE.
"When an estate passes by purchase it acquires a new heritable
quality descendable in the blood of the purchaser generally.
The heir is liable out of the inheritance for the bond debts of the
ancestor. The purchaser takes the estate free. When one under
a conveyance acquires an estate in the same manner that he
would have acquired it by descent and without the conveyance,
should this be called purchase it would be a fraud on bond cred
itors, and hence is ruled to be descent.
So we have the rule: When an ancestor by any gift or con
veyance takes an estate freehold, and by the same conveyance his
heirs take in fee in remainder, the word heirs is not a word of
limitation but of inheritance. The heir, if he takes at all, takes
by descent and not by purchase. Thus where an estate is con
veyed to A for life with remainder in fee to A's heirs, the heirg
do not acquire the remainder by purchase, they take, if at all,
by descent. The chief effect of the rule is to enlarge the life
estate into a fee.
In this country land and personalty devolve in the same way,
hence the effects of the rule are far reaching. In some States
the rule has been abolished by statute, in most of them it has
been modified. This is a rule of legal construction and not of
intention, and cases falling under it must be determined by the
former and not by the latter test.
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CHAPTER XXIII.
TITLE BY PURCHASE.
The usual methods of losing and acquiring title by purchase
are: G-rant, Gift, Sale, Devise, Prescription, Judicial Sale, Mar
riage.
I. Grant. In theory of law the title to all lands originate in
grant from the State. In many eases this is the fact, and the
State has directly conferred on an individual the title to land
within her territory. In all other eases the theory is adopted
for the sake of uniformity. It has already been explained how
titles come through the general government, through cession,
conquest, discovery and otherwise. The methods of obtaining
grants of land are set forth in the statutes. Usually an actual
settler is entitled to take up a certain number of acres of the
public land, and by complying with the necessary farmalities
he secures a grant, which is evidenced by a. writing under the
seal of the State, issued by the proper authority.
II. Gift. A gift is the voluntary transfer by the donor to the
donee of the title to land. In order to make a valid gift there
must be an intention on the part of the donor to convey, ac
ceptance by the donee, and the perfection of the intention in the
legal mode. The most usual method is the execution and de
livery of a deed. The subject of deeds will be considered later.
Any act, which is recognized by the law as sufficient to pass the
title, whereby the donor loses the dominion and transfers it to
the donee, will perfect a gift, that is to say, will make it irre
vocable. A gift being voluntary, not founded on valuable con
sideration, it is not good until the title passes. The power of
an owner to give away his land is limited by the rights of his
creditors to collect their debts out of it. A man must be just,
before he is generous, and can not strip himself of the means of
meeting hLs obligations. Therefore any act thus done or con
veyance thus made, for the purpose of hindering, delaying or
defrauding creditors is void. This applies to all manner of acts,
but in the case of a gift of land, the absence of consideration is
a strong circumstance.
"When we come to discuss contracts, we shall see the necessity
for a consideration in an executory contract, and a valuable
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consideration is money or its equivalent or marriage. A deed in
consideration of marriage is not a gift.
III. Sale and Conveyance. This is the usual method of trans
ferring the title to realty. Here the owner, called the vendor,
conveys to the vendee for a valuable consideration the title to
land. The evidence of the transfer is usually a deed.
DEEDS.
We will inquire briefly into the requisites of a deed conveying
the title to land. In the broad, sense, a deed is any writing
sealed and delivered by the parties. It includes a promissory
note under seal, bond, mortgage and other instruments. At this
point, we speakof those deeds only which affect the title to land.
There is no prescribed form for a deed. It must contain: (1)
Proper Parties; (2) Sufficient Consideration; (3) Proper Sub
ject Matter; (4) It must be executed according to law; (5) It
becomes effective on delivery.
Before taking up these requisites in their order, it is well to
mention some preliminary formalities. The deed should have
the proper venue, i. e., the State and county where the deed is
made should be written first. It is many times advisable to use
a preamble or preliminary explanation of the circumstances
under which the deed is made. Thus if a will give the exec
utor the power to sell and convey land of the devisor, the execu
tor's deed should open with a preamble reciting the clause of the
will conferring the power.
1. Proper Parties. A deed is the most solemn contract that
can be made, and the rules of contract usually govern as to the
ability of the parties. Any owner of an estate in land may con
vey title to same and execute the deed, provided he is not labor
ing under some legal disability, such as infancy, lunacy, idiocy,
coverture.
(a) Idiocy. An idiot is one born without sense and incapable
oF acquiring knowledge. Clearly such an one can do no binding
legal act. The deed of an idiot is void ab initio,
(b) Lunacy. Person non compos mentis is one deprived of
reason, it may be permanently or temporarily. Such person could
make a deed during a lucid interval, but a deed made during the
period of dethronement of reason is a nullity.
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(c) Infancy. Persons under the age of twenty-one years are
infants and labor under legal disabilities. An infant may make
a deed, but on arriving at majority, may repudiate it, provided
he return the purchase money. An infant's deed is not void but
voidable. Should he not exercise the right to avoid the deed,
the conveyance is valid.
(d) Coverture. At one period in the history of our law, a
feme covert, a married woman had no legal existence and could
perform no act in law. The laws of all the States have radically
modified the ancient doctrine .of coverture and have given the
feme powers over her properties. In some States she has power
to dispose of her separate estate, i. e., the estate set apart to her
independent of marital control. In some States evei*ything she
owned at the time of the marriage, given to her during the
coverture, or acquired by her, with the husband's consent, is her
separate estate, and her power over it is as unlimited as that of
any other owner. In some States, she cannot use her properties
to pay her husband's debts. Hence the disability of a married
woman has practically disappeared.
The deed should recite the names and residences of the vendor
and the vendee. It is safest to write the names in full, although
abbreviations of names other than surnames are allowed. If a
party is acting in any other than his individual capacity, the
fact should be clearly stated; e. g., A as executor of B, other
wise it would appear that A was conveying land of which he
had not the title.
2. Proper Subject Matter, This means that the deed should
contain a description of the land conveyed, sufficiently clear and
accurate to enable the vendee to locate it. The modes of descrip
tion differ in different localities. It is usually sufficient to men
tion the State and county where the land is situate, mark out
the boundaries by the suiweyor's plat, name the adjoining land
owners, and give approximately the number of acres or square
feet.
3. Sufficient Considerationi Consideration is the thing
which moves from the vendee to the vendor inducing the latter
to make the conveyance. It is good or valuable.
(a) Good Consideration. Love and affection are usual good
considerations. Blood kinship is sometimes called meritorious.
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A. deed founded on good consideration is to all intents and pur
poses a gift, and is binding on the parties, but may be made to
yield to the superior rights of others.
(b) Valuable CoNsroERATioN. Money, things measurable in
money and marriage are valuable considerations. These include
land, chattels, promise, detriment, forbearance and other benefits
to the vendor. Marriage has always ranked with the highest and
most binding considerations. It was a maxim of the ancient
law that a man was estopped by his seal to deny the considera
tion expressed in his deed. In some States the statutes declare
that, when necessary, the consideration of a deed may be in
quired into.
4. Estate. The deed should state the character of the estate
created, whether in fee simple, for life or other.
5. Execution. The formalities of execution of deeds are to
be found in the statute.? of the States upon that subject. In
most States it is necessary to affix the seal of the maker of the
deed, and as a necessary authentication of the seal to sign his
name either with his hand or with his mark, in the presence of
the subscribing witnesses. The witnesses, usually two in num
ber, sign their names. As to the seal suffice it ,to say that any
device or scroll acknowledged by signing the name of the person
ensealing the instrument is sufficient. The statutes provide the
methods of probating the deed for registration, usually by the
affidavit of one of the witnesses, or by one of the witnesses being
an officer authorized by law to authenticate the signature. Tue
effect of registration is to give notice of the contents of the deed
to the world, and to admit the deed in evidence in court without
other proof.
5. Delivery. It is essential that the deed be delivered. A
deed becomes operative on delivery. The date written in the
deed may be incorrect or impossible, the date of delivery con
trols. Delivery consists in any act whereby the vendor parts
with the control of the deed in favor of the vendee. The vendor
or his agent may actually hand the deed to the vendee or his
agent, may deposit it in any place subject to the vendee's pleas
ure, may deposit in the postoffice, may hand it to a common car
rier, or may even retain the actual custody with the understand
ing that it has been delivered.
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Should a deed be delivered to a third person, with instruc
tions to hand it to the vendee upon the performance of some act,
as the payment of money, until the act is performed the instru
ment is not a deed but an escrow.
REGISTRATION OF DEEDS.
All the States have laws for the registration of deeds. The
deed is copied at large on a book kept for that purpose at the
court house of the county wherein the land is situate. There
are many advantages given a registered over an unregistered
deed. It is admitted in evidence without proof. A certified
copy may be used in lieu of a lost original. Registration is
notice to the world of the contents of the deed. In some juris
dictions a registered deed takes precedence over a prior un
registered deed.
The usual method of probating a deed for registration is for
one of the subscribing witnesses to make oath in writing, called
an affidavit, of the execution. This is sometimes obviated by
having one of the subscribing witnesses an officer authorized by
law to administer an oath, who signs officially. The rules for
probating a deed executed in one State to be registered in
another State are found in the statutes of the States. Execu
tion and proof before a commissioner of deeds for the State of
registration is universally sufficient. The statutes provide other
and additional methods.
The Torens system of registration has been adopted by a few
States, and is under advisement by others. It is not necessary
to discuss the system here.
KINDS OF DEEDS.
The great number and variety of deeds invented by the old
conveyancers find no place in modern law. The most usual deeds
are comprehended under the following: "Warranty Deed, Quit
claim Deed, Lease, Mortgage.
1. Warranty Deed. This deed, as its name indicates, is used
to convey the fee simple estate in lands, with a clause of war
ranty, whereby the maker confirms to the grantee the quiet en
joyment, failing which he is liable to an action for breach of
warranty. It sometimes happens that there are in the deed col-
PRINCIPIA OF LAW 9 7
lateral agreements. Sucli an agreement is called a covnant, 1. e.,
a promise under seal. This covenant binds both parties, accept
ance of the deed by the grantee is sufficient to bind him, although
he does not seal the instniment. As most of our deeds are single,
the grantee does not usually seal the instrument. For the
breacli of a covenant, the grantor or his heir has an action at law
for damages. The difference between a covenant and a condition
has already been noticed. The general form of the warranty
deed is used, changing the language to suit the circumstances,
for conveyances by executors, administrators, trustees and offi
cers, omitting, when proper, the warranty clause.
2. Quit-claim Deed. The maker of the quit-claim deed does
not warrant the title, but simply conveys all right, title, interest,
which he has in and to the premises, and defends against him
self aud any one claiming under him. Thus A borrows money
from B and gives him a warranty deed to secure the payment.
B gives A a bond for title, i. e., a bond conditioned to reconvey
on payment of the debt. This reconveyance is a quit-claim deed.
3. Lease. A lease is executed and framed like other deeds
to land. It conveys a term of years, i. e., an interest, an estate
in the lessee for a fixed period of time. This may be a month
or many years. The difference between a lease, creating a term
of years, and a contract for the rent of land has been noticed.
4. Mortgage. In explaining the nature of a mortgage we
necessarily indicated what the instrument should contain. The
stipulations will differ in conformity to the statutes of the
several States. Sometimes it is a warranty deed with a clause
of defeasance; sometimes it merely creates a lien on the land
therein described in favor of the debt, as set forth.
4. Deeds not Conveyance.s. Deeds may be made which do
not convey title, but charge or encumber the estate. The most
usual of these is a bond for title. A buys land of B, does not pay
the whole purchase price, the latter executes to the former an
obligation under seal, with a penalty in double the amount of
the unpaid balance, conditioned, upon the payment of that
balance, to convey the estate.
IV. Devise. Devise is a method of acquiring title to land by
purchase. The laws of this country recognize the right o e
owner of land to dispose of it by will. There are some imi a
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tions on this right, in such cases as of devises made shortly be
fore death, conveying all the devisor's lands in charity, and
away from his wife and children. A will or devise is the dis
position of one's estate which he directs to be made at his death.
A devise is a bequest of lands. There is practically no difference
between a devise of lands and a will of chattels. Both become
operative on the death of the maker and affect chattels in pos
session ^g,nd lands in seisin at that time. There is no form for a
will. The intention of the testator is the guide in interpretation.
The rules, on the subject of the execution of devises, of the State
where the land is situate, must be strictly observed. In some
States a will written entirely in the hand of the maker is good,
being called a holographic will. In other States it is necessary
that the will or devise be executed, published and declared in
the presence of witnesses, sometimes as many as three, who sub
scribe the instrument in the presence of the testator and of each
other. A nuncupative will is oral. At one time it could not
convey land. Now it may. Manj' restrictions are placed lipon
such irregular dispositions of estates. The rule is that a vill
must be made in writing, the exception is strictly guarded.
The executor is the person named by the testator in the will
charged with the duty of distributing the estate in accordance
with the terms of the instrument. Executors and administrators
will be considered later. As both land and chattels of a deced
ent are subject to administration the subject can be more fully
and conveniently treated under one head.
V. Judicial Sale, At common law title to land could not be
divested by judicial sale, for the obvious reason that the ultimate
title was in the crown, and the land was not subject to the ten
ant's debts. In this country the legal distinctions between laud
and chattels has, as far as possible, been abolished. Both aie
reachable for the owner's debts. A debt having been reduced to
judgment, an execution having issued, and having been levied
on land of the debtor, the formalities of notice, and advertise
ment having been complied with, the officer of the court having
jurisdietion of land titles, exposes the land for sale at the
legally appointed time and place. The purchaser, the highest
and best bidder, is entitled to a sheriff's deed. This deed con
veys to the purchaser all the interest of the defendant in execu-
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tion in the land, and no more. The officer does not warrant the
title. This is merely a legal method of divesting the title of the
debtor and investing the purchaser therewith. The foreclosure
of a mortgage follows substantially this procedure. Execution
issues, is levied on the mortgaged premises, sale is had as above
shown. In former times the foreclosure had the effect of put
ting title in the mortgagee. Now the purchaser at public sale
acquires the title. The fund arising from the sale is applied to
the liquidation of the mortgage debt. Should there be a balance
it is paid to the mortgagor. Should there be a deficit, the mort
gage execution is satisfied. •
VI. Prescription. Prescription was formerly a mode of ac
quiring title to incorporeal hereditaments, founded on the fact
of immemorial enjoyment. Title to land could not be acquired
in this way, there was a more certain evidence, to-wit: seisin.
At the present time, title by prescription is the right which
the possessor acquire by reason of his possession for a period of
time fixed by statute. Thus it is provided tliat one who occu
pies land openly, notoriously, peaceably, continuously, adversely,
under claim of right, for twenty years, or for seven years under
color of title, has the absolute fee.
The recognition by the occupant for one moment of para
mount title in another, by such an act as paying rent, destroys
the continuity of the possession and defeats the claim.
The possession must be actual and consist of the exercise of
ownership, by erecting house.s, building fences, clearing and
cultivating the soil, planting orchards or vineyards, and occupy
ing the land either by oneself or by one's tenant.
In the case of unoccupied lands, the mere taking of timber,
establishing saw mills or the like will not be possession on which
to found prescription. Such acts are more like timber stealing.
Color of title is any writing purporting to convey title, which
defines the extent of the claim. It is immaterial how defective
and imperfect the writing may be, so that it is a sign, semblance
or color of title. The most usual instance of this title is where
the claimant has been in possession for seven years under a quit
claim deed, from one who never owned the land.
The prescriptive periods differ in the several States and are
fixed by the statutes.
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The English Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, so far as it relates
to land titles has been re-enacted in almost the same words in
every State in the Union. It provides that any contract for the
sale of lands or any interest in or concerning them, to be binding,
must be in writing, signed by the party to be bound or by some
one bj' him thereto duly authorized. Thus title to land in con
templation of law originates in writing. Prescription presup
poses a grant. The theory of law is that the uninterrupted en
joyment of the premises for the requisite time is sufficient evi
dence of the existence of a proper conveyance. This conveyance
is supposed, in the lapse of time, to have been lost or destroyed.
VII. Escheat, Escheat has a very ditferent meaning in mod
em law to its signification in England. "Where there was an
interruption in the feudal tenure, the land passed by escheat to
the over-lord, of whom the tenant held. At present, it means
the return of the title to the State, in case the owner dies with
out any representatives capable of taking, and without dis
posing of the land by devise or otherwise. The land is liable
to the claims of creditors, which must be satisfied before escheat
can operate.
The principle is that the sovereignty is the ultimate heir of
abandoned properties.
VIII. Forfeiture. Frofeiture to the crown of land and goods
was one of the elements of the punishment for felony at com
mon law. Forfeiture for crimes has been universally abolished
in this country.
As has been explained for certain acts or omissions of the
temporary tenant for years or for life, the interest may be for
feited in favor of him next in succession. This is perhaps the
extent of title by forfeiture today.
IX. Marriage. The acquisition of title to land by marriage
was at one time important in this country. In former time the
doctrine of merger of legal personality prevailed in full force.
The husband acquired the control of the wife's lands during the
coverture, and after her death the curtesy estate for his life
therein. So far as the ownership of properties is concerned this
doctrine has been modified or entirely superseded in all the
States. The married woman retains the ownership of her land
during coverture. So that no general rule other than this can
be given.
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CHAPTER XXIV.
PEBSON^VLTY.
Says a modern writer, this term "includes all objects and
rights, which are capable of ownership, except real estate or
some interest therein." Chattel is frequently used as synony
mous with personality. Chattel in the modern acceptation does
not include chattel real, that being regarded as an interest in
realty. Chattels, as we shall treat of them, are chatties personal
or moveables. In contemplation of law they accompany the
body of the owner. Hence we have the rule that the personalty
of a decedent is distributed according to the laws of the place
of his residence. Examples of chattels are money, clothes, jew
elry, animals, harvested crops, bonds, deeds, notes, stock scrip
and other evidences of debt or value.
PROPERTY IS PERSONiU>TY.
Property in chattels may be absolute or qualified. The na
ture of the property is determined from the character of the
thing sometimes, and sometimes from the fact of possession.
These are the most important tests. In some things a qualified
property only can be had; in other things two persons may
have a property at the same time the one qualified and the other
absolute. In the latter case possession and the nature of the
possession usually determine the rights of persons.
Absolute Property. Absolute property in a chattel is the
complete ownership which gives tke owner the right of possession,
control, and disposition. Chattels in absolute ownership are sub
ject to the debts of the owner.
Possession. Possession is actual or constructive. Actual
possession is the manual control and pernancy of the chattel.
As where the owner of a ring has it on his finger. Such pos
sessor having the absolute property in the chattel has now the
entire property therein; i. e., the right of property and the
actual possession. If he have not the right of property, he has
the bare possession only. In case of a chattel possession is prima
facie property, and the possessor may defend his right at law
or otherwise against all except the true owner.
Actual possession extends beyond the mere physical manu-
caption of a chattel. Thus a horse in a man's stable is in his
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actual possession. A flock of sheep in care of a shepherd is in
the actual possession of the owner. The shepherd has a mere
custody and not possession.
Constructive possession may be said to exist where the owner
is not in actual pos.session but has the right to the immediate
actual possession. This does not by any means cover all eases
of constructive possession, but is sufficient for our present pur
poses. The owner of a chattel having the right to the imme
diate possession, the possession being in another, has what is
called a choSe in action, i. e., a thing out of pos.session, which
he may reduce into possession by an action at law. In case A
loan B a horse, A has the property in the horse and the con-
stiuctive possession, B has the actual possession. The former
has a chose in action, the latter a chose in possession.
Qualified Property. Applying the test of possession we may
now learn the meaning of the term qualified property in chat
tels. If A delivers a watch to B to be repaired A has the gen
eral property in the watch, and for some purposes the construc
tive possession. B has the actual possession and the right of
possession, which constitute a qualified property. Each and
both have a complete property in the same chattel at the same
tnue. The one general and the other qualified.
There are some things in which man can have, from their
very nature, a qualified property only. Such things are light,
air fire, water, and animals of a wild nature.
Animals Ferae Naturae. One has general property in a
vvi animal in his custody and control. Thus a circus cora-
pan> ^us wild animals in cages and under the control of keep
ers. en a wild animal escapes from custody, one of two
imp oceuis, either the animal goes back into the common own-
eraiip an maj' be taken and owned by any one, or the qualified
remains. If the animal is in the true
frn^ ^ ^ or an eagle, such animal escaping
^ ^ becomes common, the property of the custodian is
occupy such auiiiial to his use and acquire
ff Where, however, the animal has what is
revertendi, i. e., is accustomed to return to the
nf le owner when permitted to go at large, the propertyowner is not lost by such going at large. If such animal
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is fit for food, the taking of it is larceny; if not fit for food, it
•is a.civil trespass.
PROPERTY IX CHATTELS, ACQUISITION AND LOSS.
• The methods of acquiring and losing property in chattels are
much the same a.s those applicable to estates in laud, presenting
such divergencies as the inherently difEerent nature of the two
species of propertie.s demand. The usual methods are: Occu
pancy, Increase, Confusion, Gift, Contract, Succession, Testa
ment, and Judicial Process.
Occupancy. Occupancy is regarded by many writers as the
original means of acquiring property in chattels. Supposing
all things to have been originally in common, each occupant had
a temporary property, which continued during occupancy only,
and was lost on quitting the occupancy, the chattel returning
into common. At present, this is of but small importance and
applies in the ca.se of the finding of goods, which the owner does
not come forward and claim. It must he remembered that this
does not apply to those things which by voluntary abandonment
or by abandonment at death without a successor go hack into
the common and pass to the State as ultima haeres. It is a
principle in modern societies that everything capable of owner
ship shall have an owner ascertained by law. Laws of property
are intended to point out the owner and to protect his property.
Incrilyse. This rule applies usually to the increase of do
mestic animals. The property in such increase vests in the
owner of the female. Partus sequitur ventre. If A's stallion
fertilize B's mare, the foal is omied by B.
Confusion. The ancient doctrine was that one who inten
tionally mingled his own goods with those of another, so that
the parts could not be segregated, lost the goods so commingled.
Of two parties the innocent one shall not suffer. It is doubtful
if there is any important instance in modern times where this
doctrine prevails. It is a familiar fact that grain of many own
ers isstored in hulk in grain elevators, and the property of each
owner in his proportionate part of the whole is clearly recog
nized. The same is true of cotton in a gin warehouse, and of
cotton seed in hulk. It was endeavored to apply the doctrine
to the mingling by a fiduciaiy of trust funds with his own, hut
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a court of equity very wisely awards the full due to the bene
ficiary and leaves the residue to the fiduciary. •
Gift. A gift is the gratuitous transfer of the property in a
chattel from one called a donor to another called a donee. A
gift being gratuitous is not complete until the donor has done all-
that is necessary to part with the property in favor of the
donee. Delivery of the chattel or acts equivalent to delivery is
necessary. If the transaction be not thus completed, it is no
gift, but a mere promise without consideration, i. e., nudum
pactum and unenforceable. Therefore to constitute a valid gift
there must be: (1) Intention by the donor to give; (2) Accept
ance by the donee; (3) Delivery of the article given or some act
accepted by law in lieu thereof. A gift, when completed, is irre
vocable. Thus if A say to B, I give you my horse, or I will give
you my horse, it is nothing, and B cannot enforce the delivery.
But if the horse be delivered, the gift is complete and A cannot
revoke it. "What constitutes delivery and what acts are equiv
alent thereto W'ill be explained under the subjects of contracts
and sales.
Contract. The sort of contract now under consideration is a
sale. "Where pursuant to agreement the property in a chattel
passes for a consideration from a seller to a buyer a sale is per
fected. This is an executed contract of sale, the subject will be
more fully treated under the head of contracts. Suffice it to
say here that the three essentials of this transaction are: (1)
Identification of the chattel; (2) Agreement upon the price;
(3) Consent of the parties. The fact which marks usually the
transfer of the property is the delivery of the chattel or the
performance of acts equivalent to delivery. Again the transfer
may take place upon the performance by the buyer of his agree
ment, depending upon the terms of the contract. Delivery to the
agent of the buyer is delivery to the buyer, and a common ear
ner is considered the agent of the buyer in the absence of express
stipulation to the contrary. Thus if A in New York order of
B in Athens one hundred bales of good middling cotton at ten
cents per pound, and B deliver that number of bales of that
quality of cotton to the Southern Railway Company in Athens
for transportation to A, the sale is complete and the property
lias passed from B to A and the goods are at the latter's risk.
PRINCIPIA OF UAfW 105
SucCESSiox. Succession in chattels con'espouds to inherit
ance in lands. The same rules for ascertaining the distributees
apply in both species of properties. Upon the death of one own
ing chattels the property in them vests eo instanti in the admin
istrator, who proceeds to administer the estate. In any event
the first charge upon the presonalty is the debts of the decedent.
The pei-sonal representative has a period of time, usually twelve
months from the date of his qualification in which to mai-shal
the assets of the estate during which he is exempt from proceed
ings at law.
Administrator. Upon the death of one intestate, i. e., not
leaving a will, the eoui't having probate and surrogate jurisdic
tion has power to appoint an administrator. The persons en
titled to administer are the next of kin in the order named in
the statute, failing any of them, then the creditors. In some
States there is a public administrator, who qualifies in case
none of those entitled apply. Application is made to the proper
court, after the required notice given, and at the proper term,
the court proceeds to appoint and issues letters of administra
tion. The administrator takes an oath justly to discharge his
duties and enters into a bond with approved security in double
the estimated value of the estate.
Duties. The administrator will have an appraisement made,
reduce the properties into possession and pay the debte according
to their legal priority. If the funds in his hands are insuffi
cient to pay the debts, he obtains permission from the court to
sell the personalty or so much as may be needed to pay the debts.
The personalty being exhausted, he may obtain permission to sell
land for this purpose. After paying debts he distributes the
residue to the legal distributees. He makes reports of his act
ings and doings to the court whence his letters issued, and after
his final report he applies for and obtains his discharge. The
distribution of the estate, in this country, covers both realty
and personalty, title to land thus acquired is by descent; prop
erty in chtatels thus passing is by succession.
Testament. Testament or will is the disposition one wishes
made of his effects at his death. The power an owner of chattels
has thus to dispose of them is one of the oldest continuously rec
ognized rights in all the law. Human society created the right
f*5
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of propertj', and the power to dispose of personaltj' at the death
of the owner appears to be almost coeval with the birth of the
right. When the feudal laws superseded the ancient law in Eng
land, this right was lost as to landed estates and was not fully
recognized until the reign of Henry VIIL In this country testa
tors have always had the power to dispose of chattels by will
and lands by devise. There is no difference made in the
statutes in the formalities of execution of the instrument. A will
of chattels executed according to the statutes of the State of the
decedent's residence will pass the property in them, but will
not convey the title to land situate in another State unless exe
cuted according to the statutes of the latter State. A will has
already been defined and its requisites mentioned. The pro
visions of the will are put into effect by an executor.
Executor. An executor is a person named in the will by the
testator charged with the duty of administering the assets ac
cording to the terms of the will. The will is the law of the
estate. The statutes guide the administrator, the will guides the
executor.
Upon the death of the testator, the will is deposited in the
office of the proper court, and at the proper time is probated.
The subscribing witnesses or some of them make affidavit as to
the execution and the court passes the order admitting to pro
bate. Probate in common form is had without notice to per
sons at interest, in solemn form, only after full notice accord
ing to the provisions of the statutes to all interested. Should
objection to the probate, called a caveat, be lodged, the case
presents an issue to be tried in the manner provided by the laws.
Upon the will being admitted to probate, letters testamentary
issue to the executor. He takes and subscribes "an oath, and
sometimes gives a bond, usually the will excuses him from this.
Duties. The duties of the executor are practically the same
as those of the administrator up to the point of the distribution
of the residue after paying debts. Frequently the will excuses
him from formalities imposed by law upon the administrator,
as in the matter of inventories, appraisements, the manner of
making sales and the like.
Distribution. The properties bequeathed in a will are called
legacies and the recipients are legatees. Legacies are special
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and general. A becjuest of a specific chattel or of a definite sum
of money is a special legacy, and will have preference in the
distribution. The bequest of a share or proportional part of
an estate is a general legacy. In case of a deficiency of assets,
such legacy must be scaled to pay debts, before a special legacy
is intrenched upon.
Me.vxing of Terms. In case the administrator, after qualifi
cation and before dismission, die, resign or is removed, the court
appoints a successor, who is charged with the administration of
the goods not already administered. He is called an admin
istrator de bonis non . Should an executor be disqualified or
refuse to accept, the court appoints his successor. Being the
appointee of the court and not of the testator he is an adminis
trator, but as there is will to guide him in the discharge of his
duties he is called an administrator cum testamento annexo, i. e.,
with the will annexed.
In case an executor, after qualification, be removed, become
disqualified or die, the court appoints his successor, to admin
ister the estate not already distributed, according to the terms
of the will. He is called an administrator de bonis non, cum
testamento annexo. It sometimes occurs that one administers
the estate of a decedent without obtaining letters of administra
tion, without propounding a will and without obtaining letters
te.stanientary. He is not an adminitrator, not having been ap
pointed by the court. The law presumes that a will is in exist
ence, in which he is nominated executor, therefore he is called
an executor. But as the legal fonnality of his recognition has
not been complied with he is an executor in his own wrong, i. e.,
an executor de son tort. He is held to a higher degree of ac
countability than a regular executor or administrator, in case
he mismanage the estate.
Judicial Process. Property in chattels may be transferred
from the owner to a purchaser at judicial sale. A ministerial
officer by virtue of a levy on a debtor's goods, or of an order
of court of equity, an executor or administrator, under permis
sion of the proper court, may sell in the manner prescribed by
law, such levied chattels, or such goods of the decedent, and the
purchaser acquires therein the property.
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EtJLES OF CONSTRUCTION.
The rules for the interpretation of written Idstruments are
here given, with the same comment, that was made on the rules
for interpreting laws.
1. The construction must be favorable, and accord with the
apparent intention of the parties; and must also be reasonable,
and agreeable to common understanding.
2. Where the intention is clear, too minute a stress shall not
be laid on the strict and precise meaning of the words and
grammatical construction.
3. The constinietion shall be made on the entire instrument,
not on disjointed parts, where discrepancies appear, that con
struction shall be adopted which gives effect to all the parts.
4. The instrument shall be taken most strongly against the
maker. In case of a conveyance, the highest estate, the lan
guage is capable of creating, will be created.
5. Of two constructions one agreeable to law, and the other
contrary thereto, the former shall be adopted.
6. Of two totally repugnant clauses, in a deed, the former;
in a will the latter prevails. The first deed and the last will
are effective.
7. Wills are more favorably expounded than deeds. The in
tention of the maker is the supreme test. Other rules yield to
this.
PRINCIPIA OF LAW 109
CHAPTER XSy.
CONTRACTS.
Contracts permeate the whole law of personal rights partic
ularly of property rights. So important is the subject that all
modern writers on general law give it a separate treatment.
"While the general rules of law define and enforce the rights,
duties and liabilities of persons to each other and to society,
there is scarcely an instance of dealing between persons, in which
the parties are not permitted by an agreement to regulate the
details of the matter. The contract is the law of the transaction.
Within the limits prescribed by law the power to contract is
without limit. Thus in the contract of bailment, there are cer
tain legal obligations of which the bailee cannot relieve himself
by contract. Up to that point, the power to vary the obliga
tions of the parties is unrestricted. A common carrier is bound
to exercise diligence, as prescribed by the statute, in the care
and transportation of goods bailed to it. Within this general
limitation, the carrier can by contract vary in an infinite num
ber of \vays the obligation.
Definitions. "A contract is an agreement upon sufficient
consideration to do or not to do a particular thing," says Black-
stone. In Sturges vs. Crowningshield, Chief Justice Marshall
said: "It is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do or
not to do a particular thing." Both these definitions are of
contracts wherein something is to be done or omitted by the
parties in the future, i. e., executory contracts. They do not
cover the great body of obligations, now classed as contractual,
wherein one party is bound to do or refrain in return for some
thing already done or foreborne by the other, i. e., executed
contracts. The former are bilateral, the latter, unilateral.
The original concept of a contract was the voluntary meeting
of minds. Contracts in modern law cover a far wider field, they
extend to contractual obligations where the volition is presumed
from the acts of the parties, or where the contractual obligation
is imposed by law independently of volition. Hence under the
general terra contract is included: (1) An agreement, a vol
untary meeting of minds; (2) An obligation imposed on one
party based on a benefit from the other party, the facts showing
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an intention to recompense, i. e., a contract impiied by law as
a matter of fact, for the purpose of eifectuating an evident in
tention; (3) An obligation imposed by law upon one party to
recompense for a benefit received from the other party, where
there is no intention to repay, i. e., a contract implied by law
as a matter of law, for the purpose of protecting a right and
affording a remedy, called a qiiisi contractual obligation.
To illustrate the three concepts: A enters B's shop, agrees
with him on the price of a book, B agrees to deliver the book.
Both are bound by contract, the one to pay the price, the other
to deliver the book. Again A enters B's shop, takes a book and
walks out. A has receive a benefit from B under circum
stances evidencing an intention to pay for it. One party has
performed, the other is obligated to perform. A is under an
implied contract to pay for the book. Again A entei's B's shop,
secretes a book, taking it away. Here A has received a benefit
from B without intending to reimburse. The law feigns both
the intention and the promise for the purpose of protecting B
and affording him a remedy. A is obligated to pay for the book
under a quasi contractual obligation.
We quote, with some modifications the language of Laurie, J.,
in the ease of Hertzog vs. Hertzog. "There are: (1) Express
contract, where the terras of the agreement are openly uttered
and approved'at the time of the making; (2) Implied contracts,
which are (a) Resulting contract, which arises from facts show
ing mutual intention to contract; (b) Constructive contract,
which is a fiction of the law adopted to enforce a legal duty
by action of contract, where no proper contract exists.
We have constructive fraud, constructive trust, constructive
notice, and whys not a constructive contract, a contractual obli
gation existing in contemplation of law in the absence of any
agreement. With apology, we shall use the term quasi contract
as covering obligation created by law and enforceable by an
action ex contractu."
There are, as we shall see, contractual obligations imposed
•upon parties where there is no consideration, notably on accom
modation endorsers of negotiable instruments. This is perhaps
one reason why Judge Marshall omitted consideration from his
definition.
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In view of the foregoing, and with much hesitation we submit,
that: A contract is an obligation assumed by the parties, or.
imposed by law from their acts or from the facts.
) Express 1. Resulting froju the facts.
Contracts J Implied 2. Constructive by the law.
ANALYSIS.
Parties. Whether viewed as an agreement or an obligation
(nexnm) a contract must have at least two parties. They must
be per.'ons able in law to contract or amenable to the legal obliga
tion of the contract. The usual test of ability to contract is the
power to will to do or not to do. This is not universal. Many
persons have the power to exercise volition who cannot legally
contract, and many transactions are held to be contractual in
the absence of volition or of even the power to will. The gen
eral rule as to ability is that all persons have power to contract
except those laboring under legal disability. Those partially
or totally unable to contract are: idiots, lunatics, infants, mar
ried women, and persons under duress.
Idiots. An idiot is a natural fool, one born without intelli
gence and without the ability to acquire it. He can do no bind
ing act in law. Being without natural capacity, he has no legal
ability. This rule of law i.s wisely designed more for the pro
tection of the unfortunate than for the limiting of legal powers.
An attempt to contract with an idiot is void, and the other party
acquires no rights thereunder. All the acts necessary to be
done for the purpose of protecting an idiot in his rights are
performed through a person .sui juris regularly empowered and
known as a guardian.
Lunatic. A person of none sane mind is called in law non
compos mentis. A lunatic, during periods of insanity, can make
no binding contract, contracts made during lucid intervals are
binding. A monomaniac may well make a contract relating to
a subject other than that of his peculiar mania. A lunatic is
endowed with reason and intelligence, but they have been over
thrown by drugs, disease or misfortune.
Infants. Person under the age of twenty-one years is an in
fant and labors under partial disability to contract. On arriving
at the age of majority he may usually repudiate contracts made
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during infancy. Should he fail so to do within a reasonable
. time he is held to affirm a contract which was voidable at his
option. He may affirm or disaffirm by words, acts, silence or
failure to act. In case of repudiation he will be compelled to
restore any benefit he may have received under the contract.
Infants' Contracts. An infant may bind himself by con
tract for the necessaries of life, which include food, clothing and
medicines. In most States he may contract for education, i. e.,
tuition.
This contract must be clearly distinguished from those in
stances where the parent is made liable for necessaries furnished
his infant child. The law imposes a duty on the parent to fur
nish suitable necessaries to his infant child, to be judged pri
marily by the parent. In ease he fail in this, the law regards
the infant as the servant of the parent and empowers him to
bind the master by contract. The difficulty, if any exist, lies
in determining what are necessaries suitable to the condition in
life. These differ in each case.
An infant may bind himself as an apprentice to learn a trade.
He may sign a peace bond and a criminal recognizance.
"Where an infant, with his parent's consent, engages in inde
pendent business, he is as to that business sui juris and his con
tracts are valid and binding.
So when the infant is emancipated from parental control his
contracts are valid.
Married Women. Anciently at the time of marriage, the legal
identity of the woman was merged into that of the man, and
during the coverture the feme covert being non existent in law
could do no legal act and was of course unable to contract. Con
tracts for necessities of life, under certain circumstances, were
made by her, but were binding upon the husband, by virtue of
his legal duty to support the wife. This is not the contract of
a feme covert, but is the contract of her hu.sband made through
her.
The first step toward recognizing the right of a feme covert to
contract was taken when the law conferred upon her separate
ownership. As a noce.ssary consequence of this ownership she
acquired the power to make contracts relating to her separate
estate, and binding upon her to the extent of the separate in-
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terest. The distinct legal existence of the feme covert for many
purposes is now recognized, and to the extent that this is true
in the several jurisdictions, her power to bind herself by con
tract is recognized. In most of the States the wife may, with
the husband's consent, become a free trader, and thus prac
tically free herself of the disabilities of coverture as to the bus
iness in which she engages. She may engage in trade and em
ploy her husband.
These disabilities were mentioned under Domestic Relations
and Deeds. The repetition, however, is proper and perhaps
necessary.
Duress. Duress is compulsion w-hich takes away free agency.
Treating a contract as an agreement, i. e., a mutual voluntary
act, it is manifest that one who consents under compulsion is
not entering into a voluntary agreement. This duress may be
produced by physical force, by threats or by fear otherwise in
duced. The question to be decided in each case is whether the
consent is the result of duress or not. The presumption is in
favor of the contract. There being no other disability, duress
to avoid the contract must be established by proof. A promis
sory note given to procure the forbearance to prosecute the
maker criminally is not collectable, having been procured
through duress.
Formation of Contract. Agreement in the original defi
nition of contract carries with it also the idea of the manner in
which the result is reached, how the minds came together or how
the contractual obligation was imposed, what facts are express
or implied, the former are wi'itten or oral, and written contracts
are special or simple.
Express Contract. An express contract is one where the
terms are set forth at the time the contract is made. This is the
simplest form of contract. The terms may be declared orally
or in writing. This relates to the manner of proving the con
tract only.
Oral Contract. "Where the terms of the contract are de
clared by word of mouth, by one party and assented to by the
other, here is clearly an agreement, a meeting of minds, an ora]
contract. Thus A says to B, I will give you ten dollars for the
\
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books you are now reading, and B saj's I will take it, the con
tract is complete.
"Written Contract. When the terms of the contract are re
duced to writing and accepted by both parties, whether in writ
ing or not, the transaction is complete. As the writing is pre
sumed to express the intention of both parties, parol testimonj'
will not be heard to vary the terms of the writing except fraud,
accident or mistake be shown.
The meaning of the writing may be shown and omissions may
sometimes be supplied by parol testimony. If A offers to deliver
to B within thirty days one hundred bushels of corn at sixty
cents per bushel, and B accepts the offer and the agreement is
embodied in a memorandum in writing, signed by both parties,
this is an easily understood express written contract. Should
B make and deliver to Aa promissory note promising to accept
one hundred bushels of corn and to pay sixty cents per bushel
for it within thirty days, this is a written contract binding on
both, although only one signed the writing.
Specialty. A written contract under seal is called a specialty,
all others are simple contracts. Aspecialty has a higher dignity
than a simple contract. The general rule is that the maker is
estopped by his seal to deny the recitations in the writing. This
rule has been relaxed in some States, and the consideration of
a deed may properly be the subject of inquiry. That the seal
imports consideration is no longer an unrebuttable presumption
of law. Promissory note.s under seal are free from the bar of
the statute of limitations for a longer time than simple notes.
There are certain contracts which are required to be sealed,
no a y a ee o an . What constitutes a seal has been explain
ed elsewhere. The Statute of Frauds provides that certain con-
tracts shall not be enforceable unless reduced to writing. This
subjects will be discussed when we come to treat of that Statute.
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Implied Contract. When one pei*son has received from
another an advantage, the idea of gift being excluded, this is in
law an executed consideration, it creates an indebtedness which
the law presumes will be repaid. Where the facts show an in
tention to return the consideration or the equivalent, the con
tract is implied by law as a matter of fact The law feigns a
promise to fulfill an obligation, for the purpose of effectuating
the intention. Where no evidence of intention to reimburse
exists, the contract is implied by law as a matter of law, juris et
de jure. Here both intention and promise are feigned for the
purpose of affording a remedy, by an action for breach of con
tract. The former is an implied contract pure; the latter is a
quasi contractual obligation having the force of a contract. It
must always be remembered that should the circumstances or
the relations of the parties show that a gift was intended, the
presumption of a contract does not arise. Illustrations of the
two kinds of implied contracts have been given, they might be
indefinitely multiplied. Some of the most usual which occur
in transactions between man and man are given in the chart.
Distinctions. Contract is the generic term for all enforceable
contractual rights, and includes all the kinds from an actual
volition of the parties to an obligation imposed by law.
Agreement is the voluntary meeting of the minds of com
petent parties on a subject matter for a consideration, and is the
original concept of a contract.
Promise is the express or implied assent of a party in return
for an executed consideration, or for a promise.
Obligation is a duty or liability imposed by law in return for
an executed consideration and amounts to an assumption thereof.
Agreement makes a contract. Legal obligation implies a prom
ise.
Offer and Acceptance. Offer and acceptance is the fact
whereby the contract is made and the contractual bond estab
lished. It is a rule of law that the offer must be accepted
wholly and exactly, and usually in the manner, as made. Any
thing less or other than this would be simply a counter offer,
•which the other party is at liberty to accept or reject. If A
offer to deliver free on board at port one hundred bales of good
middling cotton at ten cents per pound to B, and B consents to




























































































































